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This thesis explores the problem of extrapolating causal claims in the social sciences,
particularly economics. The problem of extrapolation is the problem of inferring
something about a phenomenon of interest in one context, based on what is known
about it in another. For example, we may want to infer that a medicine works in pop-
ulation Y , based on the fact that we know it works in population X. Extrapolation is
the inferential process of generalizing or transporting claims about a phenomenon of
interest to new populations or settings. The answers to the problem of extrapolation
in philosophy of science aim to explain how successful extrapolation is possible, as
there will always be relevant differences between the two systems.
I study extrapolation from the viewpoint of philosophy of science, which aims to
both analyze and complement science and scientific knowledge. I also use a case
study with two examples to further illustrate the relationship between the theoret-
ical approaches to extrapolation in philosophy of economics and actual studies in
experimental economics. I focus on comparative process tracing, a general account
of extrapolation developed by philosopher of science Daniel Steel, and its success in
extrapolating causal claims from field experiments in economics.
The first chapter introduces central concepts and key questions. The second chap-
ter discusses external validity, a concept typically used in economics to describe the
potential of causal claims to be extrapolated. The third chapter introduces compar-
ative process tracing, which explains how and why extrapolation can be based on
knowledge about causal mechanisms. Next, I discuss field experiments in economics
and methodological issues of extrapolation particular to them. The fourth chapter
consists of a case study, which shows the limitations of approaching extrapolation in
economics with comparative process tracing. The last chapter concludes.
The central conclusion of this thesis is that even though comparative process tracing
is meant as an account of extrapolation that can explain and apply to extrapolation
across disciplines, applying it to economics faces methodological challenges. Never-
theless, the issues it faces with regard to field experiments in economics do not refute
it as an account of mechanistic extrapolation. I propose that comparative process
tracing is a theoretically comprehensive epistemological account of extrapolation in
the social sciences, but it must be complemented with a systematic methodologi-
cal account of problems of extrapolation in practice. This methodological account
complements and enhances epistemological analysis of extrapolation.
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Tutkielma tarkastelee ekstrapolointia eli yleistämistä yhteiskuntatieteissä. Se kes-
kittyy kausaalisten johtopäätösten yleistämiseen taloustieteessä. Ekstrapolointi on
ongelma tilanteissa, joissa halutaan päätellä jotain tutkittavasta ilmiöstä yhdessä
populaatiossa tai ympäristössä sen perusteella, mitä siitä tiedetään toisaalla. Yk-
sinkertaistaen: voidaan päätellä, että lääke toimii populaatiolla Y sen perusteella,
että lääkkeen tiedetään toimivan populaatiolla X . Ekstrapolointi on päättelypro-
sessi, jossa tutkittavaa ilmiötä koskevat kausaaliset väitteet yleistetään tai siirretään
uusiin populaatioihin tai ympäristöihin. Tieteenfilosofiset vastaukset ekstrapoloin-
nin ongelmaan pyrkivät selittämään, miten ekstrapoloinnin onnistuminen on mah-
dollista, vaikka populaatioiden ja ympäristöjen välillä on aina eroja.
Tutkin ekstrapolointia tieteenfilosofian menetelmin. Tieteenfilosofisen tutkimuksen
tavoitteena on tutkia ja täydentää tieteellistä tietoa. Keskityn tutkielmassani tie-
teenfilosofi Daniel Steelin kehittämään, vertailevaksi prosessinseurannaksi kutsut-
tuun lähestymistapaan, jonka mukaan ekstrapolointi voi yhteiskuntatieteissä perus-
tua tietoon kausaalisista mekanismeista. Erityisesti keskityn siihen, kuinka hyvin
vertaileva prosessinseuranta vastaa taloustieteen kenttäkokeissa nouseviin ekstrapo-
loinnin ongelmiin.
Ensimmäinen luku esittelee avainkäsitteet ja -kysymykset. Toinen luku tarkastelee
ulkoisen validiteetin käsitettä, jota käytetään taloustieteessä kuvaamaan kausaalisten
johtopäätösten yleistettävyyttä. Kolmas luku esittelee vertailevan prosessinseuran-
nan keskeiset periaatteet. Seuraavaksi tutkin taloustieteen kenttäkokeita ja nistä
yleistämiseen liittyviä menetelmällisiä kysymyksiä ja ongelmia. Neljäs luku tarkas-
telee kahta esimerkkitapausta, jotka osoittavat vertailevan prosessinseurannan me-
netelmälliset rajoitteet taloustieteessä. Viimeinen luku päättää.
Keskeinen johtopäätös on, että vaikka vertailevan prosessinseurannan on tarkoitus
vastata ekstrapoloinnin ongelmiin monilla tieteenaloilla, sen soveltaminen taloustie-
teeseen on vaikeaa. Menetelmälliset haasteet, joita sen soveltamisesta nousee, eivät
kuitenkaan kumoa vertailevaa prosessinseurantaa mekanismeihin perustuvan ekstra-
poloinnin teoriana. Esitän, että vertaileva prosessinseuranta on teoreettisesti kattava
lähestymistapa ekstrapolointiin myös yhteiskuntatieteissä, mutta sitä tulee täydentää
systemaattisella katsannolla menetelmällisiin ongelmiin, joita ekstrapolointi kohtaa
käytännössä. Ymmärrys menetelmällisistä ongelmista täydentää ekstrapoloinnille
keskeisten epistemologisten ongelmien analyysia.
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11 Introduction
1.1 The Problem of Extrapolation
Experiments are tools for scientific inquiry. They are a systematic way of studying
causality and identifying causal relationships. An experiment implements an inter-
vention on a putative causal relationship: it manipulates an assumed causal factor
X in order to see how the intervention affects the outcome, Y . Ideally, the effects of
any factors that might disturb the causal relationship are controlled. (Guala, 1999,
p. 555) Depending on the researcher’s aim, experiments can be used for a variety of
purposes, including theory testing and data collection. Experimental results can be
used to draw inferences about the studied phenomenon in order to clarify its nature,
explain why it happens, or predict whether or how it will happen in the future.
Experiments can be used as surrogate systems of reasoning when a phenomenon
of interest cannot be directly studied for one reason or another (Baetu, 2015, p. 947).
This is also the case with economic behavior, which can often be observed but not
studied directly. We can observe that banks give small business loans to applicants
who are in different situations financially, but it is impossible to observe all business
loans given by all banks in real time. We cannot determine the precise effect of a loan
on a person’s financial situation just by observing the loans’ effects in a scattered
bunch of individual recipients.
Without controlled study, we cannot determine whether any positive effects
came about because of the loan, or because at the same time, the applicants won
in the lottery, inherited money, or completed a degree that put them in a different
position on the job market. Thus, experimental economists have devised ways of
using experiments to investigate the effects that microcredit programs, where small
loans are given to applicants, have on poverty. In the experiments, microcredit is
2given to some participants but not to others. The effects of the given microcredit
are then systematically tracked within the two groups and the results compared. In
other words, economists use a separate, smaller, controlled system to figure what
could be going on in more complex systems.
The idea of experiments as surrogate systems of reasoning is to create a rep-
resentative system from which inferences about a phenomenon can be generalized
(Baetu, 2015). Inferences about the phenomenon in an experimental system have
to be extrapolated, if they are taken as correct in or applied to somewhere else than
the experimental system. The problem, especially in the social sciences, is that the
causal relationships that hold in the small, simplified experimental system may not
hold in other, more complex circumstances. Observing the effects of a microcredit
program in the smaller system is easier, but in the more complex system, people,
businesses and banks might act, and their behavior be interpreted, differently. Be-
cause of this, inferences from an experimental system to a target circumstance or
population are always inductive.
This is the problem of extrapolation, which is the focus of this thesis. The
problem of extrapolation is a concern for both observational and experimental stud-
ies in a variety of fields, including the social sciences, medicine, biology, psychology
and climate science (see e.g. Guala, 2005; Steel, 2008; Parker, 2010; Cartwright &
Hardie, 2012; Baetu, 2015; Westreich et al., 2018). At its most general, extrapola-
tion is the process or activity of inductively inferring conclusions about something,
for example a causal effect, in one situation or system, based on inferences about the
same (or a similar) causal effect in another system (Steel, 2008, pp. 3, 78-79, 87-89).
Westreich et al. distinguish between two kinds of extrapolation: extrapolation as
generalization, which means generalizing causal claims about an effect observed in a
study sample to the population that the study sample is drawn from. Extrapolation
as transportation means transporting the claims to entirely new populations or con-
3texts. The concepts of “generalizability” and “transportability” correspond to these.
(Westreich et al., 2018, p. 438) This is a distinction I will follow in this thesis.
Experimental science, climate models, clinical trials, and policy recommenda-
tions use extrapolation in order to explain and predict causal effects within different
systems. Issues of extrapolation are of philosophical and scientific, conceptual and
methodological interest. Issues of extrapolation are particularly pertinent if experi-
ments are used to guide policy. If economic experiments are to be used as a source
of evidence in successful policy-making, inferences from them have to be applicable
outside the experimental system (Reiss, 2013, p. 187). Extrapolating an inference
about the effectiveness of a policy from one group of people to another has con-
sequences not only for the people included in the study, but everyone included in
policy recommendations drafted on the basis of research. Overall, extrapolation
is a key issue in applying inferences about the results of scientific studies to new
contexts (cf. Guala, 2005; Steel, 2008; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Baetu, 2015). It
also intersects with a variety of questions in philosophy of science, such as causa-
tion, causal inference, causal explanation, and causal heterogeneity; prediction; the
role of models, simulations and experiments in science, and their epistemology and
methodology; and evidence and expertise (cf. Steel, 2008).
Extrapolation is a multidimensional question related to a variety aspects of sci-
entific inquiry, both theoretical and practical. It is a concern for many different fields
of science, and there are many kinds of extrapolation: from an experimental system
to a non-experimental system, from one population to another, from a population to
an individual, from an individual to an individual, and from an individual to a pop-
ulation. You can extrapolate in time, between geographical locations, or between
species. Many kinds of evidence, theoretical and empirical, can be used to justify
extrapolation, and sometimes extrapolation can succeed based only on a lucky guess.
Different kinds of inferences and claims can be extrapolated, including claims about
4causal effects, about correlations, and about characteristics or properties.
Extrapolation may be necessary, such as in cases where an experiment is con-
ducted to inform and design economic or health policies. In those cases, it is crucial
that the experimental system represent the non-experimental system, and that the
extrapolation from the former to the latter be justified. Extrapolation can also be
more speculative, such as in cases where researchers conduct an experiment and
discuss whether those experiments tell us about the same phenomenon in other
circumstances. In these cases, extrapolation can take on many forms, from vague
speculation to rigorous use of experimental evidence for explaining or predicting
phenomena in new domains.
This multidimensionality alone poses a challenge for any general investigation
of extrapolation, and that is why this thesis focuses on the extrapolation of causal
claims from experimental systems to non-experimental targets. I focus on the ex-
trapolation of claims about causal effects and relationships, because that is what the
philosophical literature on extrapolation has focused on thus far, and that is what
the most developed accounts of extrapolation concern. Policy-relevant studies in
economics, especially studies that aim at evaluating policies, are typically interested
in finding causal effects. Consequently, it is of interest whether claims about them
can be applied to new contexts.
This thesis focuses particularly on comparative process tracing, a proposed so-
lution to the problem of extrapolation in social science and biology. Comparative
process tracing is an account of extrapolation that grounds warranted extrapolation
in the similarity of the causal mechanisms in the system where the causal claims
are extrapolated from and the system they are extrapolated to (Steel, 2008). The
account was developed by Steel (2008), and Steel presents it as a solution to two
epistemological puzzles regarding the knowledge one needs for extrapolation to be
5both successful and justified1. However, comparative process tracing is not meant
only relevant in theory and for philosophy, but also in practice for scientific method-
ology (Steel, 2008, p. 6). Steel uses an example from biology, about the carcinogenic
effects of aflatoxin B1, to show that comparative process tracing solves the episte-
mological challenges of extrapolation, and works as an account of extrapolation in
practice (cf. Steel, 2008, pp. 79-80, 88-96).
In addition to biology, comparative process tracing is meant as an account of
extrapolation that can be “usefully employed in social science”, and in principle,
there is no reason it could not be (Ibid, 149-150). Nevertheless, Steel is skeptical
about comparative process tracing succeeding in the social sciences (Ibid). This
thesis takes a look at whether Steel’s skepticism regarding extrapolation as compar-
ative process tracing in the social sciences is warranted. Philosophers of economics
have discussed both the epistemic and the methodological problems that extrap-
olating causal claims from experiments in economics faces, but the discussion on
other than laboratory experiments and experiments studying behavior in naturally
occurring contexts is very small (cf. Viceisza 2016, 386). This thesis complements
that discussion by exploring the consequences of using comparative process tracing
to approach extrapolation in other kinds of field experiments in economics. Drawing
on the extant literature, I give an overview of the methodological challenges that
applying comparative process tracing to economics faces.
Baetu (2015) writes on extrapolation in the life sciences. He analyzes how
scientists think about extrapolation, and argues that they treat it as an issue of
“taking an epistemic risk” (Baetu, 2015, p. 944). According to him, thinking about
a universally applicable solution to extrapolation is misguided. Instead, one should
ask how scientific research can be planned so that the possibility of error in taking
that epistemic risk is controlled. (Ibid.) The question underlying the analysis of this
1These will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.
6thesis is whether Baetu’s arguments also apply to extrapolation in the social sciences,
particularly economics. Overall, they are supported by my study of extrapolation
in economics.
1.2 Field Experiments
Field experiments are tied to a variety of theoretical and methodological questions
related extrapolation. As the case study will show, field experiments exemplify the
need to supplement comparative process tracing with a more specific account of the
methodological questions related to not only external validity, but also extrapola-
tion. Economists use laboratory, field and natural experiments to study behavior,
decision-making and economic phenomena (Reiss, 2013, p. 174-175, 192-193). In
laboratory and field experiments, the experimenter studies causality by manipulat-
ing causal factors one at a time, controlling possible confounders, and observing
the outcomes of this iterative process (Guala, 1999, p. 555-556). In natural experi-
ments, nature or society provides the experimental intervention and the researcher
only needs to gather, organize and interpret data (Harrison & List, 2004, p. 1011,
1041-1042). In field experiments, the context is less artificial or strictly controlled
as a laboratory procedure, but the aim is nonetheless to keep control over some or
all of the putative causal factors (Harrison & List, 2004).
Field experiments can and are used for a wide variety of practical purposes,
from testing theories to informing policy. Laboratory experiments in economics can
be divided into three categories: those that “Speak to Theorists”, “Search for Facts”
and “Whisper into the Ears of Princes” (Roth, 1995, p. 22). Experiments in the first
category are ones that empirically test formal theories and investigate unobserved
regularities and anomalies. Experiments that search for facts are conducted in order
to collect information about the phenomenon of interest. Whispering into the ears
7of princes is the task of experiments that aim at guiding policy and showing policy-
makers effective ways of reaching policy goals. (Ibid.) Field experiments also fit into
these categories (List, 2007, p. 2). This thesis is especially interested in experiments
that aim to provide policy-relevant results, which often fall into more than one of
these categories.
Field experiments are conducted for a wide variety of reasons, methodologi-
cal and otherwise. Large-scale field experiments enable economists to study and
gather a large amount of data about different kinds of phenomena, like taxes, health
and employment. Field experiments may provide a solution to problems that the
presumed artificiality of laboratory experiments can cause with respect to extrapo-
lation (Jimenez-Buedo & Miller, 2010; Jimenez-Buedo & Guala, 2016). Third, field
experiments can be conducted to study the limitations of laboratory experiments
(cf. Levitt & List, 2007a,b). By conducting the same experiment with the same
participants in the laboratory and in the field, List (2006) is able to study how well
laboratory results extrapolate to the field. Others doubt the inherent generalizabil-
ity and transportability of inferences from field experiments for various reasons, for
example because they might turn out to be good for studying very situation-specific
causal effects, which do not extrapolate well (Gneezy & Imas, 2017, 440).
1.3 Method and Structure of the Thesis
This thesis studies extrapolation mainly within the context of experimental science,
through theoretical frameworks provided by philosophy of science. According to
Steel (2008), his book “explores how and under what circumstances reliable extrapo-
lation is possible in biology and social science, and explores some of the implications
of this topic for issues in philosophy of biology and social science.” (Steel, 2008,
p. 4). After Steel’s book, much of the development of accounts of extrapolation
8in philosophy of science has happened through discussion of the methodological as-
pects of extrapolation, in addition to discussing the epistemological questions that
extrapolation raises. This thesis continues the aforementioned extrapolation and
the ongoing discussions.
Chang (2004) writes about history and philosophy of science as complemen-
tary science, that is, fields of inquiry whose aims are continuous with science itself.
History and philosophy of science complement science by generating scientific knowl-
edge regarding the questions that the sciences (what Chang calls “special sciences”)
have no resources to focus on, or need to neglect out of necessity to specialize. His-
tory and philosophy of science do not include science, but they can analyze science
(Ibid, 236-240). Philosophy provides conceptual tools for “organized skepticism and
criticism”, and history is a central supply of the forgotten questions and answers of
science (Ibid, 240) Ultimately, the aim is to study not only science, but that which
science studies: nature (Ibid, 237).
This is also the methodological starting point of this thesis. In developing
comparative process tracing, Steel’s aim is not only to understand scientific practice,
but also the nature of causality, extrapolation and the phenomena different sciences
investigate. He analyzes extrapolation conceptually and methodologically, both as
a process of inductive reasoning about causality as well as a practice in science. By
doing so, he explains how, when and why extrapolation in biology and the social
sciences can be justified. In order to investigate comparative process tracing as an
account of extrapolation in the social sciences, I follow the methods articulated by
Chang and put into use by Steel. I also conduct a case study to take a closer look
at how comparative process tracing can be applied to actual cases in economics.
The use of case studies in philosophy of science is not uncontested (cf. Currie,
2015). Science is heterogeneous, and philosophers tend to use particular case studies
to draw generalizations about science in an epistemically unjustified way (Ibid, p.
93). However, I use case studies not to draw inductive generalizations about science,
but to show a philosophical point. Comparative process tracing is a theoretically
comprehensive account of extrapolation and remains important because of its con-
tribution to understanding the importance of causal mechanisms and information
about them in extrapolation. With the case study, I conclude that in order for com-
parative process tracing to fully account for extrapolation in economics, the practical
challenges related to experimental methodology have to be taken into account also
by epistemological approaches to extrapolation. To understand extrapolation as a
philosophical and a scientific issue, comparative process tracing has to be comple-
mented with a methodological account detailing how to address the challenges that
extrapolating with mechanisms faces in practice.
In the second chapter, I introduce the notion of external validity, with which
problems of extrapolation are typically conceptualized in economics. Next, I present
comparative process tracing. The general idea in process tracing is to trace the mech-
anisms in the model circumstance and combine that information with background
knowledge about mechanisms in the target population to conclude whether or not it
is likely that the causal claim drawn on the basis of the model will hold in the target
(Steel, 2008, pp. 7-8). After presenting comparative process tracing, I discuss field
experiments, and the issues that are relevant to extrapolation and external validity
regarding their methodology. The fourth chapter consists of the case study, and the
fifth chapter concludes.
2 Internal and External Validity
Experiments are correctly performed when experimenters can both control and inter-
pret the experiments and their results properly (Guala, 2001, p. 461). Put generally,
implementing experimental control means setting up the experiment so that no dis-
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turbing factors affect the causal relationship being studied. Internal and external
validity are two concepts used to interpret and analyze an experiment and its results
(Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, p. 271-272). The concepts were originally coined by Cook
and Campbell in the late 1950s, and have been under discussion since (Ibid, 272).
Philosophers of science focus on analyzing the concept of external validity and its
role in reasoning about causal claims and extrapolation in science. In economics, the
focus of the external validity discussion is on assessing and developing methodology
rather than conceptual analysis.
Roughly defined, internal validity describes whether the causal claims drawn
on the basis of experimental results are reliable (Ibid, 271-272). It is a concept
that describes whether the observed effects can be correctly attributed to their
effects (Roe & Just, 2009, 1266). External validity, on the other hand, is a concept
used to interpret experimental results as having the potential to be generalized
to circumstances outside the experimental system (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, p. 271-
272). In this chapter, I present the discussion on external validity in philosophy of
economics and consider the definitions given to the concept, as well as the arguments
for and against its usage.
2.1 The Concepts of Validity
Put generally, validity in empirical economics describes whether a conclusion from
an experiment is likely to be true, or whether it approximates the true conclusion
or inference well (Roe & Just, 2009, p. 1266). The concepts of internal and exter-
nal validity are used in disciplines from psychology to the social sciences, including
behavioral and experimental economics2 (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, p. 272). In the
2The concepts of statistical conclusion validity and construct validity have been distinguished
from internal and external validity (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, p. 272). Statistical conclusion validity
describes whether statistical methods are used correctly to determine relationship between vari-
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methodological and philosophical literature, the definitions of and distinction be-
tween the concepts of internal and external validity are far from self-evident (Ibid,
272-273). In particular, it remains unclear what the different kinds of validity are
attributes of (Ibid, 273-275).
Cook and Campbell, who developed the concepts, define internal validity as:
“the approximate validity with which we infer that a relationship between
two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the
absence of cause” (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 37)
and external validity as:
“the approximate validity with which we can infer that the presumed
causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measures
of the cause and effect and across different types of persons, settings,
and times.” (Ibid.)
According to the definitions proposed by Cook and Campbell, internal validity
describes whether the inference that the experimentally observed effect is causal is
valid or not. It tells us, as Cartwright writes, “that in the experimental situation,
the causal hypothesis is true” (Cartwright, 2007, p. 39). External validity describes
whether the inference that the causal claim can be generalized to circumstances
outside the experimental system is valid or not. This inference typically proceeds
ables. Construct validity refers to the validity of inferences from experimental particularities to
general theoretical constructs. (Cook & Campbell, 1979, pp. 37-38) Roe and Just define ecolog-
ical validity as the similarity of the context of an experimental task or situation to a presumed
real-world choice situation (Roe & Just, 2009, p. 1267). Ecological validity can also be thought of
as a dimension of external validity, along with other dimensions such as population validity and
temporal validity – extrapolating to another population, or within the same population but to a
different time (Guala, 2005, p. 142).
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by comparing the model and target system for relevant differences and similarities
(Guala, 2005, p. 180). If no relevant differences are found, the causal claim is con-
sidered externally valid. External validity can be interpreted as denoting a binary:
either the experimentally observed causal effect remains or is likely to remain in-
variant in a specific target, across a range of targets or in general, or not (Deaton
& Cartwright, 2018, p. 10).
Despite the attempts to define internal and external validity, especially the
concept of external validity remains unclear. The concepts of validity, particularly
external validity, are used to describe experiments, types of experiments, experimen-
tal results, experimental data, and experimental inferences (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, p.
273-274). More recently, Marcellesi writes about “two properties of the conclusions”,
where the conclusions are drawn from experimental or nonexperimental studies and
aim at estimating causal relationships (Marcellesi, 2015, p. 1308). Jiménez-Buedo
concludes that the only way to use the two notions consistently is to use them to
describe causal claims (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, pp. 274-275). Experimental results
are the observations and data gathered during an experiment, and causal claims
concern the causal processes, mechanisms or dependencies whose existence or op-
eration we infer from the experimental results (Guala, 2005, pp. 41-44). As such,
causal claims (here taken as synonymous with causal inferences), not experimental
results, are internally or externally valid. This is also the sense in which I will use
the concepts of internal and external validity.
2.2 The Many Uses of External Validity
The two concepts of validity did not play a major part in discussions of experimen-
tal methodology until the late 1980s and early 1990s (Heukelom, 2011, p. 18-20).
Vernon Smith, the key figure in founding and developing experimental economics,
13
wrote about precepts, or conditions, by which an experimental system is made into a
real microeconomic system (Bardsley et al., 2010, p. 199). Experimental economists
in the 1970s did not think that any division between the experimental system and
a world “outside it” was accurate or methodologically useful. An experiment encap-
sulates the economic phenomenon itself, and inferences about the experiment hold
for all economic phenomena of the same ilk. (Heukelom, 2011, p. 19-20). One of
the precepts, parallelism, expresses this idea (Bardsley et al., 2010, p. 199-200). By
the 1990s, the internal and external validity were used with regularity as contrasting
concepts that experimental economists could use to “think about their experiments.”
(Heukelom, 2011, p. 22)
In the extant literature, analysis of external validity ranges from using the
concept to evaluate the accuracy of predictions about the effectiveness of a policy
program to detecting the factors that affect the generalizability and transportability
of experimental inferences. In econometrics and political science, the concept of ex-
ternal validity surfaces in the study of causal inference, randomized experiments, and
predicting the effectiveness of policy programs. External validity is quantitatively
measured to evaluate the accuracy of causal predictions, and statistical methods for
estimating external validity are developed. For example, Meager (2019) develops
methods for quantifying the heterogeneity of the effects that compose the average
effect, or average impact, of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) testing the effec-
tiveness of microcredit. If it is heterogeneous effects that make up the average,
predicting the impact of microcredit in a new context on the basis of the average
will be “at best uncertain and at worst infeasible ” (Meager, 2019, p. 16). Quantify-
ing the heterogeneity of local effects means quantifying the external validity of the
average effect (Ibid). This helps understand the impact of the tested policies, as
well as the accuracy of predictions about the effectiveness of those policies in future
sites.
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In experimental economics, on the other hand, external validity is used more
as a general term for identifying the factors, conditions and parameters that affect
the generalizability or transportability of experimental inferences to “other circum-
stances” in general or a single target in particular. Still, the use of the concept of
external validity varies also within experimental economics (Nagatsu & Favereau,
unpublished, p. 20-22). Esther Duflo, one of the most notable figures of the evidence-
based policy movement, and her coauthors define external validity in much the same
way as Campbell: “whether the impact we measure would carry to other samples or
populations. In other words, whether the results are generalizable and replicable”3
(Nagatsu & Favereau, unpublished, p. 21; Duflo et al., 2007, p. 3950). Experimental
economists not working with evidence-based policy focus on external validity partly
because of the criticism aimed at laboratory experiments (Nagatsu and Favereau,
unpublished). They want to include the “context-richness” that Loewenstein (1999)
called for (Heukelom, 2011, pp. 21-22).
Referring to concerns of external validity, Loewenstein criticized experimental
economists for a variety of reasons, one of which was that experimental economists
tend to minimize the real-world content in their experiments, which then reduces
external validity (Ibid, 22). Field experiments conducted by the “lab-minded” exper-
imental economists answer these criticisms and aim to increase external validity by
adding real-world context to the experimental design and setting. They also study
whether laboratory results predict field results and vice versa. Analysis of external
validity focuses on pinpointing the ways in which the phenomenon of interest the
validity of claims about it are affected by changes in the experimental design (see e.g.
Harrison & List (2004); List (2007); Levitt & List (2007a,b); Nagatsu & Favereau
(unpublished).
3As the quote alludes, replicability and external validity are two intertwined concepts. Due to
restrictions of space, I will not discuss their relation here.
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2.3 Against External Validity?
Validity asks “how well the scientific operation achieves what it aims to achieve”
(Heukelom, 2011, p. 13). Correspondingly, economists and philosophers treat inter-
nal and external validity as conceptual tools used to evaluate experiments (Jiménez-
Buedo, 2011, p. 272). Some philosophers take a critical stance toward this and have
critiqued the use of the concept in analyzing experiments. The criticism can be cat-
egorized into two intersecting strands. The first strand consists of criticism against
the idea of external validity as a concept of generalizability or transportability. The
second consists of criticism at the idea that external validity is a relevant concept for
evidential reasoning, for example regarding experiments aiming at policy guidance.
Jiménez-Buedo (2011), and more recently Deaton & Cartwright (2018) and
Reiss (2018) all argue that the use of the concepts of internal and external validity
as a concept used to evaluate experiments should not be encouraged. Jiménez-Buedo
argues that the concept of external validity is not a good concept of generalizability
or transportability. It is vague, ultimately indistinguishable from internal validity in
a meaningful way, and irrelevant for many kinds of experiments and their evaluation.
(Jiménez-Buedo, 2011) Both Jiménez-Buedo and Westreich et al. (2018) argue that
the division into internal and external validity is epistemically and methodologically
unhelpful (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011; Westreich et al., 2018).
Other arguments fall into the latter category. Jiménez-Buedo uses ultimatum
games as an example to argue that the majority of experiments in behavioral eco-
nomics aim at testing competing explanations for observations of decision-making
and behavior, for example altruism or prosocial preferences. Their point of behav-
ioral experiments is not to yield empirical generalizations: the “most pressing ques-
tions” in behavioral economics do not “pertain to matters related to the interference
of confounds nor to the possibility of generalizing the findings to other settings ex-
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cept for in very general, mostly conceptual, terms.” (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011, p. 279)
Reiss argues that using the concepts of external validity encourages bad evidential
reasoning, and proposes an alternative account of reasoning about target systems
(Reiss, 2018, p. 9-18). External validity encourages bad evidential reasoning due
to the concept’s non-contextualist nature, and argues for a contextualist account of
inferring causal claims about target systems. Like the other authors, Reiss points
out the roles that experiments may have in scientific reasoning other than providing
generalizable claims (Ibid).
Deaton and Cartwright argue that external validity does not necessarily matter
for all experiments and use randomized controlled trials as an example (Deaton &
Cartwright, 2018, p. 10-18). They argue that not all randomized controlled trials
aim at externally valid results, and that experiments that fail to produce externally
valid results should not be considered failures (Deaton & Cartwright, 2018, p. 10-
18). Guala and Mittone point that exhibits are also experiments that not concerned
with external validity (Guala & Mittone, 2005, pp. 510-511). “Exhibit” is a concept
introduced by Robert Sugden, who writes that there are two kinds of experiments
in behavioral economics: exhibits and theory-testing experiments (Sugden, 2005,
p. 291). An exhibit is “an experimental design which reliably induces some specific
regularity (or “effect”, or “phenomenon”) in human behavior” (Ibid). According to
Guala and Mittone, preference reversals, ultimatum games, and dictator games fall
into this category (Guala & Mittone, 2005). Exhibits are often not immediately
concerned with issues of external validity or extrapolation, because they showcase
anomalous behavior that is not explained by any received theory about decision-
making and behavior (Sugden, 2005, p. 291).
The examples point to similar arguments. On one hand, a more contextual
understanding of external validity would serve methodological analysis of experi-
ments better. On the other hand, the concept is too vague to provide any relevant
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insight regarding extrapolation. Furthermroe, the concept is not a useful concept in
economics or its subfields, because many experiments are not concerned with gener-
alization at all. The criticisms are correct in pointing out that external validity is a
vague concept, both by definition and in use. They also point out problems in using
external validity as the only concept to use when thinking about generalizability
or transportability. It is also true that experiments have many roles in scientific
inquiry, and that experiments aiming at formulating new hypotheses, testing the-
ory, or showcasing anomalies may not be directly concerned with generalizations or
external validity.
However, stating that behavioral economics is not concerned with empirical
generalizations seems like a narrow view of the concept of external validity, or a
narrow view of behavioral economics. If external validity is understood as a link
between an experimental finding or inference and a domain where it could travel,
then experiments that aim at capturing real-world phenomena correctly are, at least
indirectly, interested in it. Linking an exhibit that showcases a behavioral anomaly
to an empirically observed phenomenon, or use an exhibit as an “explanatory de-
vice” for patterns of behavior outside the experimental system (cf. Sugden, 2005,
p. 298), requires explaining why the behavior showcased by exhibit (or some other
behavioral construct tracked by behavioral economics and considered valid) is rele-
vant to what is happening in the circumstance of interest. This involves comparing
the experimental context in which the exhibit is observed to a real-world system –
in other words, inferring external validity.
Similarly, Gneezy and Imas (2017) argue that experiments whose point is to col-
lect facts to inform economic theory are also concerned with generalization (Gneezy
& Imas, 2017, p. 441). If experimental data is used to test theoretical models and fur-
ther develop them, then the experiment is concerned with issues of generalizability
and transportability. The authors point to economic models of financial decision-
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making, which were developed to represent how finance professionals, individuals
investing for retirement, and other market participants behave. The experiments
that tested these models in the laboratory used “a convenient sample” of undergrad-
uate students, implicitly assuming that the students’ behavior in the laboratory
would be representative of and generalize to “the relevant population of experienced
traders and financial market participants” (Ibid). The ways in which different kinds
of experiments are interested in extrapolation thus remains an important question,
despite criticism.
One way to gain more insight into the usefulness of external validity is to
investigate its relationship with extrapolation. Guala’s work on external validity
highlights this relationship. He states that economists use the notion of “parallelism”
to describe inferences from a specified model to a specified target (Guala, 1999, p.
569-570). He distinguishes the notion of parallelism from the notion of external
validity, and argues that external validity is the notion of extrapolating inferences
from inside a laboratory to another, unspecified system (Guala, 1999, p. 569). Later,
Guala argues that according to the external validity hypothesis, the causal relata in a
model system and the target system “belong to similar causal mechanisms” (Guala,
2005, p. 197). This is clarified by his reconstruction of the process of inferring
external validity:
1. If all directly observable features of the target and the experimental
system are similar in structure;
2. If all the indirectly observable features have been adequately con-
trolled in the laboratory;
3. If there is no reason to believe that they differ in the target system;
4. And if the outcome of the systems at work (the data) is similar;
5. Then, the experimental and target systems are likely to belong to
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structurally similar mechanisms (or data-generating processes). (Guala,
2005, p. 180)
The problem of external validity as understood by Guala is thus not only about
inferring or evaluating the superficial similarity of the model and target systems, but
also about whether or not the data-generating processes in the target system are
accurately captured in the model system. If the model and target systems are
structurally similar with regard to relevant causal mechanisms, inferences from one
can be generalized or transported to the other. Determining the level of similarity of
the causal structures in the systems determines the inferences’ generalizability and
transportability. As chapter three will show, this is very similar to Steel’s approach
to solving problem of extrapolation.
Westreich et al. (2018) point out that the potential of an inference to be
extrapolated is abuot “a relationship between a study sample and a target population
for a particular question – rather than a single inherent characteristic of a study”
(Westreich et al., 2018, p. 440). A target is always necessary for making claims
of external validity, because the external validity of causal claims can change with
regard to different targets (Ibid, 439-440). Without one, claims of external validity
are not meaningful (Ibid, 440). Like Guala, Westreich et al. argue that when an
experimental sample is nonrepresentative of the target population, then the external
validity of causal claims is the outcome of an inferential process that compares the
model to the target and defines the level of similarity between the two systems
(Ibid).
If the potential to be extrapolated denoted by external validity is understood as
a relation between a model and a target, the concept of external validity is relevant
to evidential reasoning in experimental and behavioral economics. If an experiment
is interested in producing causal claims that are externally valid with respect to some
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target, then we can use the concept of external validity to evaluate the relationship
between the experimental system and the target, and to what extent assumptions
about similarities between the model and target systems are justified. In short, the
concept has its use in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the experimental
system as a model for real-world causal relationships with respect to particular
targets. This does not assume that external validity is the most important concept
in assessing experiments.
As such, the concepts are useful in identifying potential sources of error and
bias in the experimental process (cf. Gerber et al., 2014, pp. 21-22). The argument
is similar to Guala’s (2012): worries about external validity are “inescapable and
indeed useful when addressed to the specific details of an experimental design, for in
such cases they help establish the reliability of specific inferences from the laboratory
to field settings” (Guala, 2012, p. 7). External validity is a useful concept not only
when discussing the potential effects of experimental design on whether inferences
travel from the laboratory to a specific target, but also when establishing whether
inferences travel from the lab to the field or one field setting to another.
In sum, whether an experiment is concerned with external validity, generaliza-
tion, and extrapolation, depend in part on what purposes the experiment is con-
ducted for, as well as the empirical phenomena the experiment is supposed to capture
or represent and the experimental results illustrate. Rather than thinking about
external validity as a non-contextual characteristic inherent to causal claims, the
concept is better thought of as describing a context-dependent relationship between
a model and a target system, specifically denoting the potential of causal claims to
be extrapolated from one to the other. This relationship is not only about the su-
perficial similarity between two systems, but whether the model system accurately
captures the causal processes or mechanisms of interest in the target system. In
general, experimental economics uses the concept to evaluate whether experimental
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outcomes can be used for good explanations or predictions of economic phenomena.
Overall, the above discussion sheds new light on the idea that there is a sin-
gle “problem of external validity”. Instead, there are various problems of external
validity regarding what it is, what it is useful for, and when. In economics and
philosophy of economics, external validity it is a useful concept for analyzing and
controlling the possibility of error. However, understanding extrapolation is key in
understanding the kinds of epistemic risks the concept of external validity is used
to mitigate. I turn to extrapolation in the next chapter.
3 Extrapolation and Field Experiments
3.1 Extrapolation as Comparative Process Tracing
Philosophy of social science usually takes the problems of external validity and ex-
trapolation as synonymous. In this thesis, I will not do so. In philosophy of social
science, the discussion has focused on conceptual and methodological analysis with
the goal of constructing accounts of extrapolation that solve some of the epistemo-
logical and methodological questions related to generalizing or transporting causal
claims from one context to another. The aim is to study, complement and inform
science and scientific practice. (cf. Cartwright, 2011, 2012; Cartwright & Hardie,
2012; Guala, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2010; Jiménez-Buedo, 2011; Marcellesi, 2015; Khos-
rowi, 2019; Steel, 2008, 2010; Marcellesi, 2015; Reiss, 2018)4. Some argue that the
4Cartwright and Hardie’s 2012 book Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it
Better, like Cartwright’s recent work on the topic in general, studies the epistemological and
methodological questions related to making good effectiveness predictions in policy, but it does
so from the viewpoints of a theory of evidence. It is thus mentioned as one of the works ad-
dressing problems of external validity and extrapolation, but will not be studied at length in this
thesis, which focuses more on analyzing extrapolation as it appears in science also outside policy
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problems of external validity and extrapolation are solved, others argue that they
are not (Jiménez-Buedo, 2011; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Marcellesi, 2015; Reiss,
2018; Khosrowi, 2019). A review of external validity shows that it is a useful con-
cept for assessing the generalizability and transportability of causal claims, but too
vague to do all the theoretical weightlifting related to extrapolation. Now that I
have discussed external validity, I turn to extrapolation itself.
Extrapolation asks what can be learned about a phenomenon within a target
system on the basis of knowing something about the phenomenon within a model
system (Steel, 2008, p. 78). Extrapolations are systematically used in science, also
as epistemic tools to gain more evidence for or against a hypothesis (Baetu, 2015,
p. 960-961). Theoretical accounts of extrapolation, such as comparative process
tracing (Steel, 2008), analogical reasoning (Guala, 2005, 2010; Steel, 2010), and the
more formal approach constructed by Pearl and Bareinboim (Pearl & Bareinboim,
2011; Bareinboim & Pearl, 2013; Pearl & Bareinboim, 2014) all aim at showing how
extrapolation can work reliably. At their core, all strategies involve comparing the
model system and the target system with analogical reasoning (Steel, 2010, p. 1058).
The basic idea is that if the systems are alike, for example in their causal structure,
then the causal effects will also be alike; the studied causal dependencies between
given variables will remain invariant in the target. In comparative process tracing,
the justification for drawing inductive conclusions between the model and the target
is grounded in understanding the causal mechanisms in both (Steel, 2008).
In the ideal case, comparative process tracing yields information about sig-
nificant causally relevant differences in the model and the target by tracing and
comparing the nodes of the causal mechanisms in each. Mechanisms are compared
to see where significant differences in their outcome are likely to occur, in order to
assess whether the causal dependency stays invariant in the target. (Steel, 2008,
predictions and evidence-based policy.
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pp. 87-92). Differences in the upstream nodes affect the downstream nodes, so only
the downstream nodes need to be compared to yield information about the causally
relevant differences between the model and target (Ibid, 79, 90). Comparative pro-
cess tracing account differs from a naive mechanistic account of extrapolation, which
argues only that information about mechanisms provides knowledge about how a
cause produces its effect and thus warrants extrapolation (Ibid, 79).
Comparative process tracing is a fruitful approach to understanding extrapo-
lation because it explains how information about mechanisms is information about
causal structures, and how mechanistic information can be used to evaluate the
relevant similarities and differences between causal systems for purposes of extrap-
olation. Both biology and social science, the fields Steel is interested in, are often
interested in understanding the mechanisms underlying causal phenomena. The role
of mechanistic knowledge in causal inference and extrapolation has been discussed
in philosophy of social science (see e.g. Steel, 2004; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010;
P. K. Ylikoski, 2017; Marchionni, 2017; Marchionni & Reijula, 2019). The Tamil
Nadu Integrated Nutrition Program (TINP) is used as an example of extrapolation
that failed but would have succeeded had there been more knowledge about the so-
cial mechanisms in the target population (Cartwright, 2012; Cartwright & Hardie,
2012; Marchionni & Reijula, 2019). The goal of TINP was to reduce malnutrition
in children by educating Indian mothers about children’s nutritional needs. The
implementation of a similar program in Bangladesh failed because there, it is the
mother-in-law and not the mother who is in charge of feeding the child (Marchionni
& Reijula, 2019, p. 56).5
5Steel formalizes his analysis of extrapolation as comparative process tracing using causal
graphs, including directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). The use of DAGS and causal diagrams in
extrapolation is also argued for by Marchionni & Reijula (2019). However, understanding them is
not essential to understanding comparative process tracing, so I will not cover the use of causal
graphs here.
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3.1.1 Model and Target Systems
In the extant literature on extrapolation and external validity, few consider the exact
roles that the target has in reliable generalization. Most use the concepts of “model
syste” and “target system” as shorthands for “where inferences are extrapolated from”
and “where inferences are extrapolated to”. Reiss (2018) calls an experimental or a
laboratory system about which something is inferred a model system. He defines
“target system(s) of interest” as “Another, related system or set of systems – often
a field system or a population different from the test population”. This use of the
concepts corresponds to for example Jiménez-Buedo’s (2011) use of the concept of
“target system”.
If the model system is a laboratory system, an experimental setup or an obser-
vational study, it typically consists of a study design with which the phenomenon of
interest, for example education, poverty or vote-buying, is investigated. Construct-
ing an experimental design includes choosing an experiment type, the participants,
the treatments, and randomization, among other things. In field experiments, the
experimental participants are usually a subset of a larger population, for example a
sample of the voters within a given electorate6.
The concept of “target” can be abstract and undefined. For example, as men-
tioned, Guala argues that external validity is the applicability of causal claims,
drawn on the basis of experimental results, to an unspecified set of target systems
(Guala, 1999, p. 596). The notion of “target” is also used to mean a defined set
of circumstances at a certain point in time. The target can also be thought of
as “the real-world system (or set of systems) whose behavior we ultimately intend
to investigate and understand” (Guala, 2005, p. 9). In economics, this is often a
6The size of the sample and its representativeness are much-discussed questions in experimental
methodology and causal inference, but they are not always the only things that determine whether
inferences about one population can be extrapolated to others.
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“nonlaboratory entity”, or an economy that is too big or complex to study directly
(Ibid).
In this thesis, the phrase “model system” is used in a general sense, to refer
to any system that is a “resembling representative” of a target system. This can
be an experimental system or an observational study. (cf. Bardsley et al., 2010,
p. 199). The phrases “target” and “target system” refer to the specific population,
setting or other context to which causal claims are extrapolated to, unless otherwise
specified. A more detailed, critical analysis on the concept of the target and its
role in extrapolation is something that will, hopefully, be a subject of discussion in
future research.
3.1.2 Challenges to Existing Accounts of Extrapolation
Steel builds his case for comparative process tracing on two epistemological chal-
lenges to extrapolation which an account of extrapolation should solve. The first is
the problem of heterogeneity, or the fact that populations are likely to differ with
respect to each other in causally relevant respects. The second is the extrapolator’s
circle, which asks for a way to get from inferences about the model system to in-
ferences about the target system in a meaningful, non-circular way.7 Steel argues
that his account of extrapolation as comparative process tracing solves both. (Steel,
2008, p. 4, 7-8 79).
Solving the problem of heterogeneity means explaining how extrapolating in-
ferences about one system to another is possible when there are causally relevant
differences between the systems. The problem of heterogeneity is especially perti-
nent when experimental or observational studies are used to inform or design policy,
because in general, policy reforms target or concern a certain population or sub-
7Both challenges were originally argued for as critiques against the methodologies of extrapo-
lating from animals to humans, by LaFollette and Shanks (Steel, 2008, p. 4).
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population. Testing those reforms, however, may be happen on a subset of these
populations, other populations entirely, or with methods that hide the heterogeneity
of effects within the population. If policy are tested on unrepresentative populations
or in unrepresentative systems, there are likely to be causally relevant differences
between the model and the target. An experiment or observational study that aims
at providing results applicable for policy has to deal with causally relevant hetero-
geneity between, but also within, populations and subpopulations. An account of
extrapolation has to explain how inferences from experimental and observational
studies can be extrapolated even when the populations’ observable and unobserv-
able characteristics, the distribution of causal factors within those populations, and
the heterogeneity of causal effects within and between the populations differ.
The extrapolator’s circle is raised by the fact that if we knew all the similarities
and differences between the model and target, conducting an experiment in a model
system to investigate a target system would be useless, and extrapolation redun-
dant. Warranting extrapolation requires knowing the relevant differences between
the model and target systems, but extrapolation is meaningful only when we do not
know what works in the target, i.e. whether there are relevant differences or not, and
how those differences might affect the causal effect. Solving the extrapolator’s circle
amounts to justifying the use of a population as a model for the target population
about which not much is known. (Steel, 2008, p. 4, 78)
Simple induction, mechanistic extrapolation, extrapolation based on causal
powers and capacities, economic engineering, and analogical reasoning have been
suggested as approaches to extrapolation (Steel, 2008, pp. 78-87). The general idea
in all is similar to Guala’s reconstruction of the process of inferring external validity:
If the causal structures in the two systems are analogical to a certain extent, extrap-
olation from one to another is justified. Each account of extrapolation attempts at
explaining what exactly is the most reliable basis for this analogy and its evaluation.
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Should it be causal mechanisms, the causal capacities, or something else?
The most straightforward strategy for extrapolation is simple induction, which
states that causal claims can be extrapolated to other circumstances unless there
is a particular reason to think that something in the target is very different from
the model (Steel, 2008, p. 78). Simple induction is an unsophisticated form of ex-
trapolation, where the analogy between two populations relies on an unspecified
criterion of “relatedness” (Ibid). Forms of relatedness, such as phylogeny or simi-
larity of economic systems, are often not a sufficient warrant for extrapolation, so
simple induction often yields mistaken extrapolations (Ibid, 80-82). As Steel shows,
however, in cases where tracing social mechanisms is not possible, information about
mechanisms can be necessary for conscientous and justified simple induction (Steel,
2008, p. 165-168).
Another way to address extrapolation is the notion of causal powers or capaci-
ties (Steel, 2008, p. 82). Think of a brick, which, by virtue of its physical properties,
has the capacity to break a glass window. Cartwright (1994) argues that only knowl-
edge of causal capacities allows us to extrapolate causal effects between populations
(Steel, 2008, p. 82). Capacities are stable across background conditions, insensitive
to variation in background variables. They include physical attributes and causal
dependencies that are tied to complex sets of interactions, such as the capacity of
aspirin to relieve pain. (Ibid, 82-83). Statements about capacities tell us what
happens when the influence of all other causal factors is removed, but also more,
because the capacity continues to influence the effect when there are other causes
present, too (Ibid, p. 82). Even though a property “carries its capacities from situa-
tion to situation” (Cartwright, 1994, p. 146), Steel points out that the necessity for
extrapolation arises when the stability of a causal relationship is doubted. In the
end, the capacities account of extrapolation does not overcome the limits of simple
induction. (Steel, 2008, pp. 82-85)
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Economic engineering is the most reliable method of solving questions of ex-
trapolation, because it turns the target system into the model system. The case
of economic engineering most often mentioned in the literature in philosophy of
economics is the Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, where
economists were faced with the task of building an auction mechanism for allocat-
ing spectrum licences (Guala, 2001). Economists constructed an auction mechanism
based on theory and tested it with experiments and simulations before implementing
it (Ibid). Similarly, researchers at the California Institute of Technology designed
and tested mobile phone auctions in the laboratory before the laboratory was ex-
ported to the real world. (Guala, 2003, p. 1204). If this strategy is followed, new
institutions are created according to what works best in the laboratory (Reiss, 2018,
p. 8). Reiss notes that this approach works best when the goal is to create new
institutions and not explain existing ones, and when similarity between the new
institution and the experiment is credible. (Ibid.)
Steel (2010) develops a generalized account of extrapolation, which he calls
analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning uses chain graphs, which are a tool for
graphical representation that consist of nodes, lines and arrows (Steel, 2010, pp.
1062-1063). Chain graphs can be used for a variety of purposes, and Steel uses
them to represent analogical inferences (Ibid, 1063). The nodes represent what is
inferred, arrows represent causality and the lines represent analogy. For two things
to be analogous, they have to be mutually similar (Ibid). Chain graphs can be used
to illustrate this kind of similarity by drawing a line between two nodes, where the
analogy is not mediated by any other node. For example, the chain graph A  B
– C ! D tells that B and C are analogical, so A and D are mutually informative.
Borrowing Steel’s example: I know Tom and Fred have similar temperaments. If I
learn that Tom is prone to emotional outbursts, then I also learn it is probable Fred
is prone to them as well. (Ibid) If I know B and C are analogical, learning A also
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tells me D is likely.
By generalizing comparative process tracing into the account of extrapolation
as analogical reasoning, Steel aims to also generalize his account of the evidence
that is needed to support extrapolation by analogy. He refines the epistemological
account of extrapolation that Steel (2008) began, but keeps the methodological
discussion minimal. Extrapolation with information about causal mechanisms is
still a pertinent question to the social sciences, as are the methodological issues of
extrapolation it raises and their implications for the account of extrapolation itself.
Accordingly, the rest of the thesis focuses on comparative process tracing and its
applicability to the social sciences.
Comparative process tracing is based on the argument that causal mechanisms
are the relevant causal structure whose understanding can help us extrapolate causal
claims from one population or circumstance to another. It is a developed form of
mechanistic extrapolation. “Naive” mechanistic extrapolation argues that mechanis-
tic knowledge and knowledge of the factors capable of affecting the mechanism form
a justified ground for extrapolation (Steel, 2008, p. 85). However, only mentioning
mechanisms and assuming that they are analogical in the model and the target does
not solve the extrapolator’s circle, because we do not know how to yield information
about mechanisms in the target without extrapolation becoming redundant. Nei-
ther does it explain how extrapolation is possible when there exist causally relevant
differences in the relevant mechanisms. (Steel, 2008, p. 79, 85).
Guala (2010) reconstructs the three steps of extrapolation as comparative pro-
cess tracing as follows:
1) Learn the mechanism in the model organism [or experimental system],
by means of process tracing or other experimental means.
2) Compare stages of the mechanism in which the two [the experimental
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and the target systems] are most likely to differ significantly.
3) In general, the greater the similarity of configuration and behavior of
entities involved in the mechanism at these key stages, the stronger the
basis for extrapolation. (Guala, 2010, 1072-1073)
Steel understands process tracing as a method of inferring the causal mechanism
between an input variable and the causal outcome or effect. This can proceed if
we have observed a phenomenon being responsible for an outcome, for example
HIV exposure causing AIDs. When we know the phenomenon as well as some
constraints on defining the mechanism components and their interactions, we can
infer the precise mechanism through which the phenomenon is responsible for the
outcome by tracing forward from a point that is known as the starting point of
the mechanism, or backwards from an end point, or both at once (Steel 2008, 87).
In Steel’s words, comparative process tracing solves the inference problem of the
form: “[g]iven both the mechanism and the phenomenon in the model, and partial
information concerning the mechanism in the target, infer the mechanism and/or
phenomenon in the target” (Ibid).
Because of this, it is important to include Steel’s point about antecedent back-
ground knowledge of the phenomenon in the target. The “central theme” of compar-
ative process tracing is that background knowledge of the points of the mechanism
where causally relevant differences are likely to arise is necessary for extrapolation
(Steel, 2008, pp. 151-152). It is how the extrapolator’s circle is solved. Only the
use of relevant background knowledge explains how limited and partial information
about mechanisms or phenomena in the target can be used for extrapolation.
The list of potential differences between populations is infinite, but ideally, all
the causally relevant differences are captured in the causal structure, namely the
mechanism. We can focus the comparison on the downstream nodes, because it
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is there that the causally relevant differences between the model and the target
populations will show. The extent to which the model must imitate the target and
minimize the number of causally relevant differences depends on the specificity of
the causal claim being extrapolated (Ibid, 8). In cases where we want to extrapolate
general claims of causal relevance, a “total absence of causally relevant disanalogies”
is not necessary (Ibid). This helps mitigate the problem of heterogeneity.
3.1.3 Mechanisms as Causal Structure
Steel understands causation in the interventionist sense, as invariance under an
ideal intervention (Steel, 2008, p.11). Interventions are intentional manipulations
of phenomena or systems (Ibid, 12). An ideal intervention implements a method of
controlled variation that is unrelated to the studied causal dependency and leaves
other causal relationships in the studied causal system intact (Ibid, 13). Steel himself
argues that a manipulationist view of causation grasps well the way the biology and
social science understand causation, but this does not make it the only useful account
of causation (Ibid, 16).
The focus in comparative process tracing is on extrapolating inferences of pos-
itive or negative causal relevance. In addition to precise, quantitative claims about
causal effects, such as those about the estimated effect of interest rates on inflation
or years of education on income, we often want to know simply whether a cause is
positively or negatively relevant to its effect (Ibid, 11, 19). Extrapolating claims of
causal relevance can be formulated as, “We know that X is a positive causal factor in
the population P, and we want to know whether it is such in the distinct population
P’ ” (Ibid, 11). If we can establish with an intervention that changes in the values
of X yield changes in the value of Y , the former is a causal factor of the latter.
This links causal relevance to probability: causal structures can be identified as
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those that create probability distributions within populations (Steel, 2008, p. 37).
According to Steel, it is “very compelling” to argue that if there is a causal depen-
dency between X and Y , then changing the value of X will change the probability
of Y (Ibid, 15). Thus, causal structures can also be used used to predict how an
intervention affects probability distributions (Ibid). We get the following definition:
(CS) Causal structure is that which generates probability distributions
and indicates how these distributions will change given interventions.
(Steel, 2008, p. 38)
Causal structure can be ascribed two roles: it generates probability distribu-
tions, and shows how interventions affect them (Ibid, 31).8 Steel argues that a causal
structure generating a probability distribution has to “exhibit behavior possessing
the combination of individual disorder and aggregate regularity”. This is one of the
central notions in the foundations of comparative process tracing. Any phenomenon
where aggregate regularities emerge out of individual irregularities can be repre-
sented in probabilistic terms and equated with generating a probability distribution
(Ibid, 198-199). Mechanisms both generate probability distributions and indicate
how the probability distributions change in response to interventions, so they are
a plausible candidate for the relevant causal structure to base comparative process
tracing on (Ibid, 32).
This does not yet sufficiently link probability to mechanisms, or illustrate how
interventions on the causal structure (i.e. mechanisms) affect probability distribu-
tions (Ibid, 198). The disruption principle, another central notion in comparative
process tracing, ties mechanisms as causal structure to the probabilistic concepts
of causal effect and causal relevance (Ibid, 54, 198-199). It entails that if one can
8Probability is here understood as physical probability, not as degrees of belief (Steel, 2008, p.
38).
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detect a relationship between X and Y by observing a change in the probability
distribution of the latter given an intervention on the former, there exists at least
one causal mechanism between the two (Ibid, 59). If there is a population within
which X and Y are causally dependent, but within that population a subpopulation
where they are not related, then the mechanism from X to Y is blocked within that
subpopulation (Ibid, 54). The disruption principle explains how disrupted mecha-
nisms do not produce probability distributions, and how undisrupted mechanisms
do. Thus, Steel argues, mechanisms can be identified with causal structure especially
in biology, and to a certain extent, the social sciences (Ibid, 31).9
Modularity is one of the conditions for causal structure, because when mecha-
nisms are modular, information about mechanisms can also be used to understand
the effects that interventions bring about (Ibid). If a mechanism is modular, then
an intervention on one of the components of a mechanism leaves the causal gen-
eralizations about the other components unchanged (Ibid, 42). In other words, I
can intervene on the mechanism from the light switch to a lit living room lamp by
taking out the light bulb, but the other causal dependencies within the system, as
well the causal generalizations governing those dependencies, remain invariant. Be-
cause modularity allows for the other causal relationships of a mechanism to remain
unaltered, it helps predict the effects that interventions bring about (Ibid, 43-44).
Steel states that mechanisms are “generally understood as consisting of inter-
acting components that generate a causal regularity between some specified beginning
and end points” (Ibid, 40). According to Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl
Craver, mechanisms are “entities and activities organized such that they are pro-
9The disruption principle follows from the principle of the common cause (PCC) and the faith-
fulness condition (FCC) (Steel, 2008, p. 55). Steel concludes that in general, assuming the PCC
and the FC is not problematic. For further analysis of the plausibility of the PCC and the FCC
in the social sciences as well as exceptions to them, see (Ibid, pp. 55-68).
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ductive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions”
(Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3).10 Steel adopts this definition of mechanism, as it is
the least insistent on any particular notion about causation and laws and how the
two are related (Steel, 2008, p. 42). He focuses on regularly operating mechanisms,
instead of singular or unique chains of events. (Steel, 2008, pp. 40).
Importantly, comparative process tracing is not only about comparing the simi-
larity of causal mechanisms in two systems. The reason why Steel argues that extrap-
olation can be grounded in comparing mechanisms is that knowing the difference-
making nodes of the causal mechanisms in the model and the target gives us in-
formation about the invariance of causal dependencies in the target. Comparative
process tracing is not about comparing causal structure only to assess the similarities
or differences between the causal structure in the model and the target, but doing
so in order to determine the extent to which a causal dependency remains invariant
in both. One critical question is, then, whether the similarity of causal structure is
the relevant point of comparison when yielding information about the invariance of
causal effects in different targets, and whether evidence about mechanisms is useful
for conclusions about invariance. Due to limitations of space, these question will
not be a central point of focus in this thesis. It is a question for further and future
research, already studied in part by Marchionni & Reijula (2019).
3.2 Field Experiments in Economics
3.2.1 The History and Methodology of Field Experiments
In this section, I review field experiments and the particular issues of external va-
lidity and extrapolation to them. Field experiments are used for a wide variety of
10What mechanisms are and how they can be defined is has been and continues to be a central
question in philosophy of science. Illari & Williamson (2012) provide one overview.
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purposes and exhibit variety in terms of methodology (Gerber & Green, 2012, pp.
8-13). Field experiments range from small-scale behavioral games to large social
experiments interested in policy recommendations. Some field experiments are in-
terested in quantitatively evaluating the effect that microcredit programs have on
poverty and others in testing how reciprocal voters in a Paraguayan electorate are,
and whether their reciprocity is linked to politicians’ behavior regarding vote-buying.
The common element to all field experiments is that they adhere to standard ex-
perimental procedure, in which ideally only an intervention or treatment induces
the operation of the studied causal mechanism or process, so that the effects of the
causes can be accurately observed. This way, the experimenter can correctly inter-
pret that the effects were only due to the treatment and not confounders. Field
experiments differ from laboratory experiments by implementing elements of “field-
ness”, or “real-world context” in their design (Harrison & List, 2004; Levitt & List,
2007b, 2009). This one of the central things the discussion on the external validity
and extrapolation of causal claims drawn on the basis of field experiments focuses
on.
At its crudest, conducting a field experiment means conducting an experiment
in which the setting that in some way resembles the actual setting where the studied
phenomenon occurs (Gerber & Green, 2012, p. 10-11). This can be the electorate
to which individual voters belong or a district where students live. However, the
setting is only one dimension or criteria according to which the fieldness of an
experiment can be evaluated (Ibid). Other dimensions include the resemblance that
the treatment has to the intervention that would be applied outside the experiment;
whether the participants are representative of the group that typically encounters
the intervention; whether the context of the treatment is like the context of interest;
and whether the outcomes of the experiment are similar to outcomes that would be
of interest to either theory or practice (Ibid).
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In short, most of the tangible elements of an experimental procedure (partici-
pants, intervention, setting) can be more or less field-like. In addition, the general
context in which the experimental participants make their decisions can be field-like,
as well as the task that they complete. The characteristics listed in the above quote
can be summarized into four dimensions of fieldness: authenticity of treatments,
participants, contexts and outcome measures (Gerber & Green, 2012, p. 11). An-
other way to evaluate fieldness is according to six criteria: the nature of the subject
pool, the information the subjects bring to the task, the commodity, the task or
trading rules applied, the nature of the stakes, and the nature of the experimental
environment (Harrison & List, 2004, p. 1010).
The motivations for implementing elements of fieldness are varied. The field is
not only better for studying certain policy-relevant phenomena than a laboratory,
but studying phenomena within the field instead of a laboratory can also be used
to infer the conditions under which different experimental types can be used as
reliable tools of scientific inquiry (Harrison & List, 2004; Levitt & List, 2007a,b,
2009). Levitt & List (2009) identify the first generation of field experiments as
beginning in the 1920’s and 1930’s with the work of Neyman and Fisher. They
developed experimental methodology in general and applied it to field experiments
in particular (Levitt & List, 2009, p. 2-4).11
The second generation of economic field experiments began with large-scale so-
cial programs implemented during and after the 1950’s (Ibid, 2, 4-7). Levitt and
List note that there are multiple definitions for social experiments, and draw on
11In addition to the generation-based categorization, a useful categorization is made by Nagatsu
& Favereau (unpublished), who argue that the development of field experiments has happened in
two simultaneously developing strands. The first consists of experimentalists interested in policy,
and who now conduct randomized field experiments and policy evaluations. The second consists
of experimentalists who conduct field experiments after moving to the field from the laboratory.
(Nagatsu & Favereau, unpublished, pp. 4-14)
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previous definitions to present social programs as experiments that include elements
of control, policy intervention and statistical analysis, and aim at drawing causal
claims about the effects of a change in policy (Ibid, 4). Accordingly, the early social
experiments measured either structural parameters or typical behavioral relation-
ships in areas like employment, national health insurance, and social benefits, and
were used to evaluate the effects of public policies related to these. (Ibid, 6.) As
examples of early social programs, Levitt and List mention a study on the effects of
electricity pricing in Britain from 1966 to 1972, and the New Jersey Income Mainte-
nance experiment, whose purpose was to investigate the effects of negative income
taxation (Ibid, 4-5).
Third-generation field experiments are smaller-scale experiments aiming to ex-
periment on ‘naturally-occurring populations in naturally-occurring settings’ (Ibid,
7). Field experiments are now used for a variety of purposes: theory-testing, fact
collection for theory construction and providing behavioral principles to sharpen
inferences from the laboratory or help with the interpretation of laboratory results
or uncontrolled data. In addition, they can be used to provide data helpful for
analyzing the causes or underlying conditions that produce the experimentally ob-
served phenomenon (Ibid). Different institutional settings, such as schools, police
precincts, public housing projects and voting wards all serve as fertile ground for
field experiments (Gerber et al., 2014, p. 10).
Harrison & List (2004) compile a taxonomy of field experiments that is based on
the level of control implemented by the experimenter. They divide field experiments
into artefactual, framed and natural field experiments, where lab experiments are
on one end of the scale, and natural experiments on the other. Field experiments,
which include multiple different kinds of designs, fall in the middle. Artefactual field
experiments most closely resembling lab experiments and natural field experiments
resembling natural experiments. (Harrison & List, 2004, p. 1013) According to
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some, field experiments provide a bridge between laboratory data and naturally
occurring data, because they include both experimental control and realism (see
e.g. List, 2007). This mixture is usually not possible in either laboratory or natural
experiments. (Levitt & List, 2009)
Artefactual field experiments are field experiments conducted much like a lab-
oratory experiment, but with an experimental population that typically consists of
participants from the context of interest (Harrison & List, 2004, pp. 1013-1014).
For example, Henrich et al. (2001) conduct ultimatum, dictator and pubic goods
games in small societies in developing countries to see whether the behavioral pat-
terns are similar to those observed and replicated in industrialized countries and
modern societies. The factors which the experimenter can control, such as payoffs
and information given to the subjects, are held nearly identical in all fifteen soci-
eties. The results show that there are major differences between the participating
societies, from which correspondence to differences in everyday life and social norms
can be inferred. (Levitt & List, 2009, p. 8)
Framed field experiments are otherwise similar to artefactual field experiments,
but they formulate the experimental tasks, traded goods, stakes and the informa-
tion given to the subjects according to the setting where the studied phenomenon
naturally occurs (Harrison & List, 2004, p. 1013-1014). The primary motivations
of framed field experiments are theory testing and policy guidance (Levitt & List,
2009, p. 9). Natural field experiments are experiments that are conducted where the
studied phenomenon naturally occurs (Harrison & List, 2004, p. 1013-1014). The
experimenter has minimum or no control over the experimental design, as the idea
is to observe controlled comparisons that occur naturally (Ibid, 1041). The subjects
do not know that they are being observed and ideally, behave as normal. This, in
the words of Levitt and List, “combines the most attractive elements of the lab and
naturally-occurring data: randomization and realism” (Levitt & List, 2009, p. 9).
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Some of the most well-known field experiments in economics today, including
the framed field experiments conducted by Duflo and her coauthors, are random-
ized trials, often called randomized controlled trials, randomized field experiments,
or policy evaluations. They have been used to study many kinds of phenomena,
including child malnutrition, the effective distribution of anti-malaria bednets, the
effect of microcredit on poverty, business training, and the impacts of educational
programs among others. In principle, randomization mitigates the problem of con-
founders (the problem of identifying observable and unobservable factors that could
potentially affect outcomes) because it ensures that the likelihood of the observable
and unobservable factors being present in the groups is equal in both (Gerber &
Green, 2012, p. 7-8).
Experimental designs can also be purposely combined and layered to see how
different designs impact the study (Harrison & List, 2004, pp. 1009-1014; List,
2006; Nagatsu & Favereau, unpublished). An experimenter can conduct multiple
experiments with differing experimental designs, and compare the outcomes to infer
that the changes in them are due to changes in the experimental design. If some
part of the experimental process – the participants, the setting, the task – is changed
to be more “field-like” and all else is kept equal, then any changes in experimental
results should occur because of changes in field-likeness. This tells us that laboratory
results might not generalize to the field or vice versa. (Ibid)
For example, the gift exchange experiment in List (2006) is a nested experi-
ment with an artefactual field experiment, a framed field experiment and a natural
experiment conducted to investigate gift exchange and prosocial preferences in the
marketplace and compare results between the experiment types. The results show
that the prosocial preferences, which emerge in both the artefactual field experi-
ment and the framed field experiment, do not emerge in the natural experiment.
(Levitt & List, 2009, p. 10). Another experiment investigates the effectiveness of
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fundraising appeals using a laboratory experiment and a field experiment (Gerber &
Green, 2012, p. 10). The correspondence between the results in the laboratory and
the results in the field is “relatively weak”, as the laboratory results do not predict
the field results very well. (Ibid). All this has been central to the discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of field experiments, often phrased in terms of
external validity.
3.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Field Experiments
The main advantage of conducting field experiments is related to external validity.
They are argued to provide results from which externally valid claims can be in-
ferred. The idea is that claims about the processes or effects observed in a field
experiment can more easily be extrapolated. However, the relationship between
field experiments and extrapolation turns out to be more complex when different
perspectives are brought into discussion with one another.
As field experimentation grew more popular, experimental economists started
to contest the notion that laboratory experiments provide inferences that are in-
herently generalizable to non-laboratory settings (see e.g. Harrison & List (2004);
Levitt & List (2007b). Laboratory experiments strip the phenomenon of interest of
its context, but the context can be relevant for the observed behavior and its inter-
pretation in many ways (Ibid). Field experiments study the target system itself, so
the results are generalizable to the target system (Bardsley et al., 2010, p. 243). On
the other hand, the set of experimental participants is rarely truly representative of
the general population they are drawn from, at least in randomized trials (Westreich
et al., 2018, pp. 439-440). This also leaves the validity of transporting claims about
the experimental results to external populations unwarranted (Bardsley et al., 2010,
p. 243; Westreich et al., 2018, pp. 440). Cartwright and Hardie (2012) and Deaton
and Cartwright (2018) also both point out the problems in arguing that randomized
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controlled trials provide inherently generalizable outcomes and inferences.
Nevertheless, compared to laboratory experiments, field experiments are consid-
ered advantageous, and this is a central motivation for conducting them (Harrison
& List, 2004; Levitt & List, 2007a,b, 2009; Gerber et al., 2014). This line of ar-
gumentation often includes reference to the artificiality of laboratory experiments.
The argument is that laboratory experiments simplify, abstract and idealize the
phenomenon of interest as well as its setting and the causal factors affecting it, and
field experiments aim to represent a more realistic, complex and diverse environment
by adding “real-world” context to the experiment (Gerber & Green, 2012, pp. 8-16;
Gerber et al., 2014, p. 23; Harrison & List, 2004; Jimenez-Buedo & Miller, 2010;
Levitt & List, 2009; Schram, 2005). Field evidence is called for because it is seen as
an antidote to the problems laboratory experiments can have with external validity
and extrapolation (e.g. Gerber et al., 2014, pp. 22-23; Guala, 2012) This has led to
argumenst that laboratory experiments have high internal validity, but low external
validity, and that for field experiments, the tradeoff is vice versa (cf. Jimenez-Buedo
& Miller, 2010, p. 302, 313-314; Gerber et al., 2014, pp. 22-23). High internal valid-
ity in the laboratory comes at the expense of lower certainty about the laboratory
depicting the properties of interest in the phenomenon of interest (Bardsley et al.,
2010, p. 242).
On the other hand, Jimenez-Buedo & Guala (2016) problematize the notion of
“artificiality” when it is applied to laboratory experiments, showing that the con-
cept itself as well as its supposed effects on generalizability and transportability
remain vague. Bardsley et al. also note that artificiality can refer to many things:
“the isolating function of the lab, its potential contaminating effects, or its alter-
ation of objects of investigation” (Bardsley et al., 2010, p. 214). Jimenez-Buedo &
Miller (2010) problematize the idea of a tradeoff between internal and external va-
lidity. Using an experiment from behavioral experimental economics as an example,
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Jiménez-Buedo and Miller conclude that replicating the experiment with slight vari-
ations to identify potential confounds remedies issues of both internal and external
validity. Therefore, it does not seem logical that there necessarily exists a tradeoff
between internal and external validity. (Jimenez-Buedo & Miller, 2010, pp. 317-
319). Instead, internal validity issues precede questions of external validity, because
if the inferences are not internally valid, there is no meaningful way to extrapolate
them (Jimenez-Buedo & Miller, 2010, p. 319; Santos, 2011, pp. 49-50)
In addition, field experiments do not automatically remove the possibility of
interaction effects, demand effects and other types of bias to affecting the experi-
mental results that are associated with the artificiality of laboratory experiments.
(Jimenez-Buedo & Guala, 2016, p. 19). Furthermore, Gneezy and Imas also point
out that due to their naturalistic context, field experiments may be inherently sit-
uation specific, and thus results are harder to replicate in new settings. This may,
in fact, contribute to difficulties in generalizing experimental outcomes or inferences
to new systems, or in comparing them to other populations or settings (Gneezy &
Imas, 2017, p. 440). Nonetheless, the nested experiments mentioned at the end of
the last section support the idea that including or excluding field-like elements can
impact the outcome of an experiment as well as the potential of the experimental
inferences to extrapolate to new targets. In laboratory experiments, the treatment
effect is easier to detect correctly, and the experiments are easier to replicate and
it is easier to compare the outcomes to those of other populations (Gneezy & Imas,
2017, p. 440).
The advantages for using field experiments to increase external validity and
ease extrapolation proves to be a cluster of interrelated methodological questions
related to the purpose of the experiment and the possibilities of controlling error
when reasoning inductively from experiments. To sum up, one could say that the
issues any kind of experiment has with internal or external validity or extrapolation
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depends on what is being studied, and what the target is. On one hand, this
highlights the fact that experimental economists also treat inductive reasoning from
experiments as an epistemic risk, because there is always uncertainty related to
the accuracy of conclusions regarding potential targets. On the other hand, this
highlights the relevance of understanding experimental methodology in different
contexts to understanding problems of extrapolation. The next section looks at
a particular methodological solution that aims at maximizing the benefits of both
laboratory and field experiments by combining elements from both.
3.2.3 Lab-Like Field Experiments for Policy
One of the central motivations for conducting lab-like field experiments instead of
field experiments in naturalistic settings is that they solve the tensions between
artificiality and external validity (Viceisza, 2016; Gneezy & Imas, 2017). Lab-like
field experiments include artefactual field experiments and framed field experiments,
when the latter are conducted in a field context (Viceisza, 2016, pp. 835-836).
Similarly, Gneezy and Imas define a lab-in-the-field study as “one conducted in a
naturalistic environment targeting the theoretically relevant population but using a
standardized, validated lab paradigm” (Gneezy & Imas, 2017, p. 440). Lab-like field
experiments combine elements from field experiments and laboratory experiments.
They maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of both types of experiments:
They use participants from the field, which increases the potential of the experimen-
tal inferences to extrapolate, and they use a laboratory procedure, which enables
control over causal factors and confounders. (Gneezy & Imas, 2017, p. 440)
There are a few reasons to study extrapolation from lab-like field experiments.
They are often conducted with policy concerns in mind, especially in the context
of development economics (Viceisza, 2016, p. 836). Secondly, in the current litera-
ture, the discussion about extrapolation in experimental economics has focused on
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laboratory experiments on one side, and field experiments studying behavior in nat-
urally occuring contexts on another (Ibid). A reason for analyzing field experiments
with comparative process tracing is that lab-like field experiments can be used in
conjunction with randomized controlled trials or other studies to yield information
about the causal processes and mechanisms leading to observed behavioral effects
(Viceisza, 2016, pp. 836, 842-843; Gneezy and Imas, 2017, p. 448). Collecting ex-
planatory covariates can help identifying the hypothetical mechanism that drives the
success or contributes to the failure of the planned intervention or policy program.
Policy makers can then use data from both experiments to plan beneficial policy
interventions. (Gneezy & Imas, 2017, p. 450-452) In other words, this information
is useful for extrapolation.
Lab-like field experiments seem like an ideal experiment if a researcher is in-
terested in outcomes about which generalizable or transportable causal claims can
be drawn from and extrapolated. They are not only concerned with the discovery
of causal mechanisms, but can also be used for that purpose. Information about
causal mechanisms is useful for causal explanation, prediction, and the design and
implementation of policy interventions (cf. Ibid, 450-452). Looking at lab-like field
experiments with comparative process tracing can not only shed light on the ap-
plicability of comparative process tracing as an account of extrapolation in social
science, but also on the specific methodological issues of extrapolation that field
experiments interested in causal mechanisms face. The next section investigates
whether comparative process tracing is applicable to field experiments in economics
in general, and the fourth chapter studies lab-like field experiments in particular.
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3.3 Field Experiments and Comparative Process Tracing
Can comparative process tracing explicate and be applied to field experiments in
economics? AS mentioned, in principle, there is no reason why comparative process
tracing should not apply to or yield useful results in the social sciences. However,
applying comparative process tracing to actual cases reveals the limitations of its
as an account of extrapolation regarding them. In this section, I first discuss why
comparative process tracing is a fruitful approach to understanding extrapolation
in the social sciences. Then, I review the challenges it faces.
Comparative process tracing is a useful account of extrapolation because it
is meant to be a general account of mechanisms-based extrapolation, applicable
across disciplines. It details when, why how extrapolation can be based on causal
mechanisms information about causal mechanisms. As the case of TINP illustrates,
this information is often valuable in itself, and also as a complement to other kinds of
evidence. As discussed, field experiments can be used for a wide variety of purposes,
including the investigation of causal mechanisms and processes underlying observed
causal effects. Comparative process tracing thus seems like a fruitful approach to
understanding extrapolation of causal claims about causal mechanisms observed in
field experiments.
Even though comparative process tracing is meant to apply to both biology and
in social science, Steel states that it is likely to not work in social science as well
as in biology (Steel, 2008, p. 9) There are two reasons for this. First, in the social
sciences, there is more uncertainty regarding whether an intervention will turn out
structure-altering. Structure-altering interventions are interventions that cause non-
modular changes in social mechanisms. If information about social mechanisms does
not tell us the effects of an intervention, the issue may be that social mechanisms
do not fulfill the conditions required of causal structure. (Ibid)
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The second challenge is that there may be uncertainty about the causal mech-
anisms responsible for a given phenomenon of interest. This complicates extrap-
olating claims for one circumstance to another, because we may not know that
the mechanism responsible for the causal dependency is the same in both (Ibid).
For example, there are two possible mechanisms to explaining preference reversals.
Whether one or the other is the correct one significantly changes our understanding
of how widely preference reversals are spread “outside the laboratory walls” (Ibid).
The applicability of the conclusions regarding the emergence of preference reversals
in the real world depends on which mechanism is correct (Ibid, p. 9, 169-174).
In an example, Steel illustrates the practical difficulties of using comparative
process tracing in social science. The case he considers is a welfare-to-work pro-
gram, implemented in various states in the United States, and evaluated with a
randomized controlled experiments. The goal of the studies was to guide changes in
welfare policy on a national level, and they were used as empirical evidence when
policymakers made changes in the federal welfare program (Steel, 2008, p. 163, 166).
According to Steel, one reason why comparative process tracing does not explicate
extrapolation in the case of the welfare program example is that randomized con-
trolled trials, in general, are good for estimating causal effects but not necessarily
for providing evidence about the social mechanisms producing those effects or the
potential of claims about those effects to generalize. (Ibid, 163). In this case, how-
ever, it seems that comparative process tracing is being applied to the wrong kind of
experiment. Comparative process tracing can be a useful account of extrapolation in
an experimental context if the experiment provides evidence of social mechanisms.
Additionally, Steel doubts whether claims about the positive causal relevance
of welfare program can be extrapolated to a national scale or to different economic
circumstances, even with information about mechanisms. Mechanisms on larger
scales are likely to differ, so any mechanistic information from the model might not
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help us infer what will happen on larger scales. (Ibid, 165-166). He compares the
welfare program experiments and the case of aflatoxin and argues that in the case
of aflatoxin, one can study metabolism in rats and compare it to metabolism in
humans, either with in vitro studies or blood samples (Steel, 2008, p. 166). It is
not certain that information about the likely similarities and differences between the
experimental system and a target ares similarly available in the case of the welfare
program (Steel, 2008, p. 166).
Additionally, tracing the relevant stages of the mechanism might not be pos-
sible. (Ibid, 166) The problem is that you can only observe the operation of a
program at the location of its implementation, and because of this, “it is unclear
that comparative process tracing can facilitate extrapolation to new locations or
larger scales”, which is what one is concerned with in the case of welfare reform
(Ibid). However, the issue of scalability is at the heart of the problem of heterogene-
ity in social science: randomized trials and smaller, non-randomized experiments
are conducted to see how an intervention will work in a particular population or
location, and to transfer that knowledge to other populations. It cannot be the
reason that any particular account of extrapolation fails, for it is the reason why
accounts of extrapolation are developed in the first place.
In addition, Guala argues that the lack of a concrete target is why extrapolating
preference reversal mechanisms fails. Without first identifying a target, comparative
process tracing “cannot even take off” (Guala, 2010, 1080). He suggests that instead
of focusing on preference reversals in ideal competitive markets, they should be stud-
ied in real economic settings where they are likely to manifest (Ibid). However, as
the last section showed, field evidence may not ameliorate the problem of extrapola-
tion. I agree that identifying a target is necessary for comparative process tracing,
but also because it helps specify the relevant background knowledge necessary for
comparative process tracing. My argument is similar to that of Reiss (2018). If the
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goal is to extrapolate the experimental findings to new contexts but a target is not
specified, it is unclear what kind of evidence an experimenter should be looking for
in the experiment in the first place, and with which methods.
Comparative process tracing begins by tracing the mechanism in the model sys-
tem. This amounts to providing a mechanistic explanation about the phenomenon
within the model. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski argue that only by knowing the ex-
planatory task at hand can one determine which details of the mechanism are rele-
vant for explaining the phenomenon, and the right abstraction level (P. Ylikoski &
Kuorikoski, 2010, p. 52). Mechanism-based explanations seek to capture the neces-
sary elements of a causal process and abstract away irrelevant details. If something
does not make a difference to the causal effect being explained, it can be left out.
(Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, 50).
When explicating the cogs and wheels of a causal mechanism for purposes of
extrapolation, knowing the target beforehand is useful because the phenomenon
in the target is what we are interested in explaining or making predictions about.
By specifying a concrete target, the extrapolator has more access to relevant back-
ground information regarding the context in which the causal effects should stay
invariant. In the paradigmatic biological example of aflatoxin B1 causing cancer in
rats, the question is whether the animal model can reliably be used for extrapolating
the claim that aflatoxin also causes cancer in humans. Knowing the target helps
choose a suitable model and a suitable method for investigating social mechanisms,
if extrapolation with mechanisms is what we are interested in.
There is also a conceptual argument to be made. As discussed, in comparative
process tracing, mechanisms are the relevant causal structure to compare between
two systems insofar they generate probability distributions and provide information
about the changes that an intervention brings about. For comparative process trac-
ing to work as an approach to understanding extrapolation, mechanisms and their
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nodes have to be traceable on the basis of experimental evidence and relevant back-
ground information. Steel uses the Machamer-Darden-Craver -definition of mecha-
nism, in which mechanisms are “entities and activities organized such that they are
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination condi-
tions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). He defines social mechanisms as, “complexes
of interacting individuals – usually classified into specific social categories – that
produce regularities among macrolevel variables” (Steel, 2008, p. 48). Marchionni
(2017) modifies the definition and defines economic mechanisms as, “complexes of
rational agents, usually classified into social categories, whose actions and interac-
tions generate causal relationships between aggregate-level variables” (Marchionni,
2017, p. 425)
Problems in extrapolating social mechanisms might not be the result of the
mechanisms not filling the conditions of causal structure, but of the concept of “mech-
anism” and “social mechanism” and their entailments being unclear. Kuorikoski
(2009) introduces two concepts of mechanism that are used to discuss and model
mechanisms in the life sciences and social sciences. These are mechanisms as com-
ponential causal systems (a CCS) and mechanisms as abstract forms of interaction
(an AFI). Componential causal systems consist of “a set of component parts fulfill-
ing different causal roles within a nearly decomposable system” (Kuorikoski, 2009,
p. 147). Taken together, are responsible or realize a causal property in the system.
The regularity and external validity exhibited by the system is due to the intrinsic
causal powers of the mechanism components and the stability that results from their
organization. According to Kuorikoski, the Machamer-Darden-Craver definition of
mechanism is an example of a CCS. (Ibid, 147)
An AFI, on the other hand, is a mechanism that explains some macro-level
property or phenomenon of interest, but one where the outcome cannot be as
straightforwardly decomposed and its causal functions, localized into component
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parts (Ibid, 150-154). Mainstream economics is often interested in understanding
macro-behaviors made up of the micro-level behaviors of individuals, households or
firms maximizing their utility (Ibid, 150). However, the macro-level phenomenon is
the result of the “cumulative interactions and interdependencies of the parts”, rather
than a streamlined causal path (Ibid). The relevant causal properties of each micro-
level unit, such as preferences, are not separable from the system the mechanism is
embedded in (Ibid).
Nonetheless, AFIs are structures that consist of parts, their operation and their
functions, which together produce a macrolevel phenomenon (Ibid, 151-152). They
just cannot be traced in the same way as CCS mechanisms. Explaining the macro-
level phenomenon by matching “component operations with different component
parts [...] with varied intrinsic causal powers” is not possible. This may cause diffi-
culties for process tracing (Ibid, 153). It follows that extrapolation as comparative
process tracing would also face challenges when dealing with AFI mechanisms. An
example Steel gives of a social mechanism is Schelling’s segregation model; it is
also what Kuorikoski uses as an example of an AFI mechanism (Steel, 2008, p. 49;
Kuorikoski, 2009, p. 151).
In other words, one of the problems in transferring comparative process tracing
from biology to social science could be that Steel’s emprical analysis of causation is
done with the Machamer-Darden-Craver -definition of mechanism in mind, but his
notion of a social mechanism assumes different causal facts and entails different the-
oretical consequences about mechanisms and reasoning with them (cf. Kuorikoski,
2009, p. 143). The issues in using comparative process tracing as an account of
extrapolation in the social sciences could also be within the mechanism concept,
used to reason about the conditions of tracing mechanisms to reach conclusions of
invariance, and not in the nature of social mechanisms.
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4 Case Study
4.1 From Reciprocity to Respect for Earned Property
The case study investigates the methodological aspects of applying comparative
process tracing to lab-like field experiments interested in social mechanisms. In phi-
losophy of economics, the cases that the debate on extrapolating experimental causal
claims has mainly focused on are auction experiments, most notably the aforemen-
tioned Federal Communications Commissions spectrum auctions (cf. Alexandrova,
2006; Guala, 2001, 2005, 2010). To recap, they were a case of economic engineering,
where the auction mechanism was constructed on the basis of theoretical knowledge,
tested with simulations and experiments, and then transported to the real world.
The target was created as an analogical system to the model.
I wanted to conduct a case study in order to understand in more detail why
comparative process tracing could or could not be applied to experiments in the so-
cial sciences. Because of the discussion on laboratory experiments and randomized
field experiments, I wanted to look at other kinds of field experiments interested in a
policy-relevant phenomena and social mechanisms. Examples of fitting experiments
were provided by two review papers, Viceisza (2016) and Gneezy & Imas (2017).
I went through the experiments listed in the review papers and chose two studies
that used lab-like field experiments to study social mechanisms responsible for the
phenomenon of interest. Both examples in the case study use laboratory and field
evidence to yield conclusions about the phenomena of interest and the social mech-
anisms underlying them; a strategy which Guala (2012) calls for. Scrutinizing the
studies through a lens of extrapolation and comparative process tracing illustrates
the usefulness of mechanistic information for extrapolation, but also the challenges
that comparative process tracing faces in practical instances of extrapolation in
economics.
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The first study is noted by Viceizsa (2016) as a study that opens the black
box of causality, or in other words, discusses the possible the mechanisms through
which an observed effect operates. The study provides evidence that the reciprocity
of individual voters helps sustain vote-buying by affecting who politicians target
when buying votes. In addition, it suggests mechanisms that explain why and how
politicians target reciprocal individuals. The study draws inferences about the way
vote-buying is sustained by voters’ reciprocity. Understanding the mechanisms that
sustain vote-buying is beneficial because if the mechanisms are uncovered, then the
practice can be monitored and its effects on electoral discipline weakened (Finan &
Schechter, 2012, pp. 863-864). The results are of interest to the phenomenon of
vote-buying in general, not just the vote-buying happening in the study setting.
The second case investigates a study where a randomized policy evaluation
tracking academic achievement is supplemented by a lab-like field experiment. It is
mentioned by Gneezy and Imas (2017) in their chapter on lab-in-the-field methodol-
ogy as a case where a lab-like field experiment is used to complement a randomized
policy evaluation in order to shed more light on the processes mediating the ef-
fects observed in the randomized study. The authors conclude that the experiments
provide evidence that academic achievement causally affect individuals’ values. In
this case, the specific changes are observed individuals’ respect for private property
rights.
It is important to note that even though the experiments rely and draw from be-
havioral economic theory, they are not experiments meant to lend support or falsify
either standard economic theory or any behavioral economic theory per se. Both
experiments investigate social preferences, which have been studied in behavioral
economics from a variety of perspectives. Social preferences are “other-regarding
preferences in the sense that individuals who exhibit them behave as if they value the
payoff of relevant reference agents positively or negatively.” (Fehr & Fischbacher,
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2005, p. 151). The aim of the studies is to investigate reciprocity and respect for
property rights, and how they are related to the macrolevel phenomena of vote-
buying and education.
4.2 Vote-Hungry Politicians Target Reciprocal Individuals
4.2.1 The Study and Its Central Outcomes
Finan and Schechter define vote-buying as the act of a voter exchanging their vote
for material goods or other forms of redistribution (Finan & Schechter, 2012, p.
864). Understanding the interpersonal relationships between voters and politicians
is crucial when studying vote-buying because the process happens through personal
interaction (Ibid). The authors argue that vote-buying can be maintained by an
internalized norm of reciprocity, because receiving money or favors from politicians
can foster feelings of obligation (Finan & Schechter, 2012, 863). They combine
survey data with evidence from a lab-like field experiment to show that politicians,
presumably knowing this, target reciprocal individuals, which provide evidence in
support of their conclusion: Individual reciprocity can help sustain vote-buying.
(Ibid, 864)
The authors use a cooperation game to measure the average reciprocity of the
members of the electorate in which vote-buying is known to happen. Reciprocity in
vote-buying is modeled as a problem of cooperation. The problem of cooperation has
a long history in political philosophy and philosophy of social science (Guala, 2012,
p. 2-3). Economists and biologists studying reciprocity posit that there exist two
different mechanisms: strong reciprocity and weak reciprocity (Ibid, 1-2). According
to weak reciprocity models, choosing reciprocal strategies must profit the agent who
plays them. In contrast, according to strong reciprocity models, the strategy that a
strong reciprocator plays does not have to be profitable. Strong reciprocators can
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cooperate in a game even when it would be more profitable to exploit the other
players. They can also punish players who choose not to cooperate at a cost to
themselves. Guala calls these two types positive strong reciprocity and negative
strong reciprocity respectively. (Ibid.)
Finan and Schechter define reciprocity as either intrinsic or instrumental. In-
trinsic reciprocity is “a person’s willingness to sacrifice his own material well-being to
increase the payoffs of someone who has been kind to him, or to decrease the payoffs
of someone who has been unkind to him” (Finan & Schechter, 2012, p. 864). This
corresponds to strong reciprocity (Finan & Schechter, 2012, p. 864, fn. 6; Sobel,
2005, p. 397, fn. 3) Instrumental reciprocity is understood as reciprocity that is
motivated by forward-looking self interest, and this corresponds to weak reciprocity
(Ibid). It is intrinsic reciprocity that causes “a kind act by one individual” to “affect
the preferences of another to elicit kindness in response” (Finan & Schechter, 2012,
p. 864, fn. 6). According to the authors, their experiments measure intrinsic reci-
procity rather than instrumental reciprocity. One-shot and anonymous play, where
the game is played only once and players are kept unknown from each other, removes
the strategic considerations linked to weak reciprocity (cf. Ibid, 869).
The central finding is that middlemen, the people employed by politicians to
offer individuals goods in exchange for their vote, are likely to target reciprocal indi-
viduals rather than nonreciprocal ones. The result does not change when the effect of
other factors are controlled for, and neither is intrinsic reciprocity a proxy through
which other cooperation-sustaining mechanisms operate. Instead, the experiment
measures a feature of the voter’s utility function, and this feature is more likely to
make the voter reciprocate noninstrumentally. The measurement of reciprocity is
“strongly and robustly” correlated with targeted vote-buying. (Ibid, 864)12
12The authors state, “A 1 standard deviation increase in reciprocity increases the likelihood of
experiencing vote-buying by 44%. This finding is robust to controlling for a rich set of individual
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The authors suggest three plausible explanations for why politicians target re-
ciprocal individuals, thereby opening the “black box”. The first explanation is that
vote-buying solves issues of commitment in voting. Standard models of elections
often suggest that vote-buying should not exist because secret ballots ensure that
votes remain unobserved and a politician’s votes unenforceable. There is no for-
mal way of contracting votes, so vote-buying by targeting reciprocal individuals is
the solution for problems raised by anonymous voting. The second explanation is
that politicians know the voters’ preferred party, and are paying them to actually
vote. Politicians have an incentive to target reciprocal individuals because they can
be paid less than their disutility from voting (as receiving money creates a want
to reciprocate), whereas for a non-reciprocal individual, the price is equivalent to
their disutility. (Ibid, 877) There are two possibilities: Middlemen would either be
dissuaded from targeting individuals with a high propensity to vote, because they
will vote independent of being offered goods, or individuals with a low propensity to
vote, because buying their vote will be more expensive. The authors cannot test for
either because they do not have a measure of someone’s propensity to vote. (Ibid,
877-878)
The third explanation is that the voters view voting as a repeated game, in
which reciprocity helps sustain cooperation (Ibid, 878). This could happen if par-
ticipants did not think their votes were secret; nonetheless, middlemen have an in-
centive to target intrinsically reciprocal adults (Ibid). Importantly, if a voter thinks
that the ballot is not secret, then they may respond to kindness with instrumental
(weak) reciprocity. They might sacrifice their immediate payoffs, and be recipro-
cal towards a middleman, “not because he is intrinsically reciprocal, but to sustain a
long-term relationship with the middleman or his party.” However, the authors state
characteristics, including other social preferences as well as social network architecture.” (Ibid,
864)
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that they can find no evidence of the experimental results reflecting instrumental
reciprocity (Ibid, 878-879).
4.2.2 Method and Experimental Procedure
The study uses data from an experiment and from the field, and is able to link the
reciprocity the authors measure experimentally to actual political behavior (Ibid,
866). The authors gather survey information on vote-buying as experienced by
members of the electorate in the 2006 municipal election, and combine it with ex-
perimental data on voters’ individual instrinsic reciprocity (Finan & Schechter, 2012,
p. 864-869). They use data from a household survey conducted in March-July 2007,
which was the fifth round of a study that began in 1991. The 1991 survey selected
300 households from 15 villages in rural Paraguay. (Ibid, 867) Over time, some of
the participants left the study. In 2002, 223 households remained, and 187 of these
sent a member to participate in experiments that measured risk aversion, trust, and
trustworthiness. In 2007 new households as well as new study components to cap-
ture voting and vote-buying were added. In total, 140 individuals both participated
in the experimental and political components (Ibid, 868).
This way, the authors are able to link participants’ experimentally measured
reciprocity to information on vote-buying in the 2006 elections in the cases of 140
players, out of the 187 original participants. (Ibid, 868-869) The authors also con-
ducted surveys with people who act as middlemen between politicians and voters in
order to grasp whether middlemen knew the voters well and whether the political
operatives offered individuals goods in exchange for their vote. The study has two
measures of vote-buying: one from data from the household survey and one from
the interviews with middlemen, which were conducted in 2010. (Ibid, 868)
The experimental component of the study is a trust game with two players
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(Ibid). As mentioned, all games were one-shot and anonymous (Ibid, 869). In the
game, the first player was given 8000 Gs and they had to decide how much of it to
send to the second player. The alternatives were to send nothing, 2000, 4000, 6000,
or 8000 Gs. However much the first player sent was tripled, and the second player
could either keep all or return a sum of her choice. Before finding out the sum that
was sent to her, the second player had to choose how much she would return if she
received 6000, 12000, 18000 or 24000 Gs, and play as she had chosen. (Ibid, 868)
The second player chose how much she wants to return according to her level
of altruism and to her level of reciprocity. Finan and Schechter explain: “The more
altruistic they are, the more they should return in all four cases. The more reciprocal
they are, the more they should return when the first mover treats them well and the
less they should return when the first mover treats them poorly.” (Ibid, 868-869).
If a player is altruistic, then they return more money in all four situations. If the
player is reciprocal, they send money back reciprocating the first transaction: the
less money is sent, the less is returned.
The authors assume that the second player thinks she has been treated well
if first player sends at least half of her Gs. If the first player sends less, then the
second player thinks that she has been treated poorly. (Ibid) The authors calculate
a measure of reciprocity by calculating the average share of the total sum returned
when the second player receives 12000, 18000 or 24000 Gs (in other words, when
they receive half or more of the money available to her). Then, the share that the
second player returns when they have received 6000Gs (in which case the first player
sent only a quarter of their money) is subtracted from the first average. This means
that altruism is subtracted out and a pure measure of reciprocity is achieved. (Ibid,
869)
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4.2.3 Challenges to Comparative Process Tracing
Evidence from the lab and the field leads the researchers to conclude that sustained
vote-buying is a result of social mechanisms. Following Marchionni’s definition,
there are complexes of rational agents, classified into social categories (voters, mid-
dlemen and politicians), whose actions and interactions create relationships between
aggregate-level variables (average reciprocity and vote-buying). Accordingly, Finan
and Schechter propose specific mechanisms through which politicians and middle-
men can target reciprocal individuals and which sustain vote-buying. At first glance,
this information is relevant and helpful if one wished to extrapolate claims about
reciprocity upholding vote-buying to other contexts.
Before discussing extrapolation to new contexts, it is worth to note that the
study already relies on extrapolation. The authors assume that claims about the
outcomes of the lab-like field experiments hold for the whole target population. Fi-
nan and Schechter choose to implement a lab-like field experiment likely because
they can use a sample of the relevant population, keep the experimental procedure
tightly controlled, and combine the results with data from the field. Questions of
generalizing from the experiment to the field, related to sample size, the represen-
tativeness of the experimental task, and other factors, are partly answered by the
choice of experimental design and the use of statistical methods.
Guala (2012) discusses some of the problems in assuming that reciprocity mech-
anisms are generalizable from laboratory to field settings. According to him, models
of negative strong reciprocity (i.e. models of costly punishment for free-riders) have
a wider scope of application, but it is not clear that they accurately capture mech-
anisms of reciprocal behavior outside the laboratory, or just experimental artefacts.
Field data does not support inferences about behavioral patterns of negative strong
reciprocity drawn on the basis of laboratory data, so the experimental outcomes
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regarding the phenomenon are likely artefactual. (Guala, 2012) Artefactual does
not mean “not real”, but that the experimental outcome occurs as a result of the
experimental conditions, and not as a result of correctly manipulated causal mech-
anisms that also exist outside the lab. (Ibid, 6-7) Models of weak reciprocity (i.e.
self-interested strategic cooperation) are better corroborated by empirical evidence
than models of negative strong reciprocity, but their scope of applicability is nar-
rower. Models of weak reciprocity apply to situations where the future over which
the player strategizes is long, there are only few players, and the flow of information
in the group is unrestricted. (Guala 2012, 2, 3-4, 13-14).
Guala also introduces the notions of a “narrow” and “wide” reading of reci-
procity experiments. According to the uncontroversial narrow reading, punishment
experiments are tools used to measure social preferences (or “robust psychological
propensities”) (Guala 2012, 2, 5-6). According to the wide reading, punishment ex-
periments capture the mechanisms that support cooperation also in the real world,
outside the laboratory. It implies that costly punishment mechanisms are what sus-
tain cooperation in real-life situations. The two readings of reciprocity experiments
should be kept separate, for the mechanisms that sustain cooperation outside the
laboratory may be very different than mechanisms that sustain cooperation outside
it (Ibid).
The experiment conducted by Finan and Schechter is not an experiment of
negative strong reciprocity, but the outcomes support claims of positive strong reci-
procity. On one hand, Finan and Schechter treat their experimental outcomes in
accordance with the narrow reading. They use the experiments to measure villagers’
reciprocity. The experiments are used as methodological tools, to turn “unobserv-
able attitudes and dispositions (“preferences”) into observable and quantifiable ex-
perimental variables”. On the other hand, while not interested in studying the true
nature of positive strong reciprocity, the authors are interested in linking experi-
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mentally observed reciprocity to reciprocity in real political life. To this end, the
authors do precisely what Guala recommends: They find data from other sources
to corroborate the experimental findings, and link behavior exhibited by the partic-
ipants during the experiment to actual political behavior. The authors are able to
argue that that the consistency of the measure of reciprocity with field data sup-
ports the conclusion that individual voters’ reciprocity helps to sustain vote-buying.
Because of this, the relevant question is rather whether the measure of reciprocity
is accurate, and claims about measured reciprocity internally valid.
What about extrapolating claims about the reasons why politicians target re-
ciprocal individuals to new circumstances? The authors suggest that mechanistic
evidence is relevant for understanding and explaining the existence of vote buy-
ing. As previous discussion has shown, it can also be relevant for extrapolation.
However, anyone wishing to extrapolate claims about the mechanisms between reci-
procity and vote-buying faces the practical challenges mentioned by Steel (2008) and
Guala (2010): There are many possible mechanisms responsible for the phenomenon,
and no concrete target is identified by the authors themselves. The authors suggest
three mechanisms responsible for the relationship between reciprocity and vote-
buying. Vote-buying is a solution to commitment issues, it is politicians knowing
the voters’ party preferences and paying the voters to turn up to vote, or it helps
sustain cooperation in a repeated game. Any correct mechanistic explanation about
the relationship is underdetermined by the available evidence, because the evidence
supports all explanations. Depending on the target, extrapolating the wrong claim
can have unintended consequences. In general, this might not be a problem, because
knowing that politicians target reciprocal individuals already gives some informa-
tion about possible interventions should someone wish to end vote-buying in their
own district. In Steel’s terms, we know that reciprocity is relevant for vote-buying.
If the turnout model is correct, then this might be a bigger problem, because the
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available evidence does not tell whether it is voters with a high propensity or a low
propensity to vote that the politicians, or anyone wishing to end vote-buying, should
target.
The study does show how knowing a target for extrapolation is necessary for
comparative process tracing to take off. If no target has been identified, knowledge
of the causally relevant similarities or differences is harder to identify. As mentioned
before, Henrich et al. (2001) show that the outcomes of behavioral games can vary in
different communities, even when the experimental procedure is held nearly identical
every time. The difference in results corresponds to differences in everyday life and
social norms (Levitt & List, 2009, p. 8). In addition, Jakiela (2011) shows that the
outcomes of behavioral experiments can vary substantially depending on the cultural
context they are conducted in. A target would indicate some of the conditions under
which the effect of reciprocity on vote-buying should remain invariant, for example
the size of the community, the magnitude of vote-buying, and the structure of the
process through which politicians and political parties buy votes.13 Additionally,
the study illustrates the many roles experiments can have in social science. Rather
than provide directly extrapolatable claims, the aim of the study is to provide new
information about a policy-relevant phenomenon, and show that the results can
be used to construct testable hypotheses about potential mechanisms that operate
between voters’ reciprocity and politicians targeting them. Its outcomes are policy
relevant precisely in the way some of the critics of external validity point out.
Overall, the case study provides a more detailed illustration of the importance of
a target for extrapolation, in order to determine the relevant background knowledge
13It is important to note that I argue that information about the target can be used to collect
and organize relevant information about the context, following of Steel emphasizing the role of
background knowledge information. I am not advocating for deciding the target in order to know
causal mechanisms in it, so the extrapolator’s circle is not triggered.
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necessary for comparative process tracing. In this case, knowing the target is useful
also for determining the consequences of extrapolating uncertain claims about social
mechanisms. On the whole, the study suggests that understanding the problems of
extrapolation that stem from experimental methodology, related to internal valid-
ity as much as transportability, also help understand the questions related to the
epistemic justification of extrapolation. For example, questions of structure-altering
interventions are not relevant to the study, because it does not propose claims about
interventions which one could extrapolate. However, interventions planned on the
knowledge that reciprocity is a relevant factor for vote-buying could run into prob-
lems of epistemic justification, if we plan a large-scale intervention on a small-scale
experiment. In sum, understanding the methodological limitations of different kinds
of experiments regarding extrapolation also helps identifying the knowledge we have
access to and need in order justify extrapolation.
4.3 Academic Achievement Affects Social Preferences
4.3.1 The Study and Its Central Outcomes
Jakiela et al. (2015) use a lab-like field experiment to measure the effects of a policy
intervention, a scholarship competition implemented in a random sample of primary
schools in Western Kenya, on the social preferences of the individuals targeted by
it. The program’s effect was evaluated by the non-governmental organization that
implemented it, and it was shown that participation in the program led to improve-
ments in standardized academic tests (Ibid, 390-391). In order to measure the effects
of academic achievement on social preferences, the authors conduct a lab-like field
experiment where participants from the treatment and control groups play a variant
of the dictator game. The authors use an instrumental variables method14 to iden-
14The instrumental variables method is a method of causal inference from statistical data. To
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tify the causal impact of participating in the program on social preferences (Ibid,
386-387). The authors use a dictator game to test whether girls who participated in
the educational intervention are less likely to appropriate income earned by others
for themselves. This acts as a measure for changes in social preferences, namely
respect for property rights. (Ibid, 386-388)
The central finding is that people from the treatment group of the educational
policy are less likely to appropriate another player’s earned income, or in other
words, that education affects social preferences (Ibid, 388). The finding is relevant
for both, educational and economic policy (Jakiela et al., 2015, p. 386) Results from
the laboratory game show that there are clear differences between participants in the
treatment group with more education attained, and the participants in the control
group, with less education attained (Ibid, 396). The participants in the former
allocate more to the player whose income is being divided than the participants
in the latter. The changes brought about by education cannot be explained by
changes in beliefs or in generalized altruism, but by changes in social preferences as
measured by changes in earned property rights (Ibid, 388,) The authors conclude
that the causal relationship between the educational intervention and behavior is
mediated by a mechanism of academic achievement (Ibid, 401-402).15
There are two explanations for how academic achievement could mediate this
infer causality between X and Y , a researcher uses a third variable, Z, that is a cause of X but
not of Y , and an effect of neither. In addition, Z cannot share a common cause with either, and
any effect of Z on Y passes through X. (Steel, 2008, pp. 178-179, 183) In this case, allocation
to a treatment school is an instrumental variable with respect to social preferences, because it is
independent of background factors that could by themselves impact social preferences (Jakiela et
al., 2015, p. 387).
15The authors state, “Point estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in academic
test scores is associated with a 10 % point increase in the share of the budget allocated to other.”
(Ibid, 388)
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effect that the authors themselves consider most plausible. First, increases in aca-
demic achievement (human capital) could alter respect for earned property rights
(social preferences) by individuals learning to embrace certain values through op-
erating in an educational environment where the exertion of effort is incentivized
and rewarded, and the benefits from said effort are private (Ibid, 402). The other
option is that an individual might observe that academic success is a signal for
later success, and chooses self-serving moral codes because they believe that high
productivity should be rewarded (Ibid).
4.3.2 Method and Experimental Procedure
Primary school in Kenya lasts for eight years, and ends in the Kenya Certificate of
Primary Education exam (Jakiela et al., 2015, p. 389). A student has to successfully
complete this exam to be admitted to secondary school, but nearly all students take
the exam, whether they are planning on continuing school or not. The intervention
whose effects were assessed by the policy evaluation was the Girls’ Scholarship Pro-
gram (GSP), an education initiative targeting girls in the grade standard 6. It was
implemented in 34 primary schools in 2000. The program aimed at improving the
academic performance of adolescent girls, and encouraging to stay them in school.
(Ibid.) In 2001 and 2002, the ICS awarded scholarships to every girl standard 6
in the Busia District who scored in the top 15% of the KCPE practice exam (Ibid,
390).
The impacts of the education initiative were evaluated in a randomized program
evaluation. 69 primary schools were randomly assigned to the treatment group or the
control group, and the schools in the latter did not participate in the initiative. In
2001, 110 girls received scholarships, and a year after, the program was implemented
for the second cohort of girls. Citing Kremer et al. (2009), the authors state that the
program improved academic performance in the KCPE practice exams among girls
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but also boys, and at all performance levels. The spillover effects may be explained
by increases in teacher attendance. (Jakiela et al., 2015, p. 390)
The experiment that measures the effect of the policy intervention on social
preferences is a variant of a dictator game (Ibid, 394). Dictator games measure
how willing participants are to share, and they have been used to measure the
beliefs, norms and ideals that ground conceptions of fairness in dividing income
(Ibid, 387).16 Dictator games are games where one player is the “dictator”, who is
allocated a certain amount of money. The dictator then decides how to divide the
amount between themselves and another player. (Ibid.)
In the version conducted by the researchers, one of the participants earns money
by completing a task, and this money is then divided between the dictator and the
other by the dictator herself (Ibid, 394-395). The dictator’s task is to appropriate
their chosen sum out of the income of the other player. Using one’s earned income
instead of unearned income generates an informal property right, and the experi-
ment measures changes in the respect for this property right. (Ibid, 387-388) Other
previous dictator game experiments suggest that more educated participants are not
more altruistic or generous, but do seem to have increased respect for others’ earned
property rights (Ibid, 395). Additionally, the authors combine the experimental
data with data from various sources: administrative data tracking individual test
scores prior to and during the intervention, and student surveys in both treatment
and control schools, and a follow-up survey administered to all women from both
the 2001 and 2002 cohorts from the treatment and control schools. (Ibid, 391).
16The trust game in the previous example is a dictator game with the sum decided by the player
who makes the first transfer.
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4.3.3 Challenges to Comparative Process Tracing
On the whole, the challenges that using comparative process tracing as an approach
to understanding extrapolation are similar in both studies, due to their similar
methods and aims. Finan and Schechter use a trust game to measure levels of
strong reciprocity of individuals. They combine this evidence to other data to
show that the individuals who behaved reciprocally are also the ones targeted in
vote-buying. Jakiela et al., use a dictator game to measure individuals’ respect for
private property, and the results of this experiment are coupled with field data and
used as evidence for the claim that social preferences were changed by the educa-
tional intervention. Again, the study provides evidence that there exist mechanisms
through which academic achievement affects an individuals’ respect for earned prop-
erty rights. The mechanisms consist of complexes of rational agents, classified into
social categories, whose actions and interactions create causal relationships between
aggregate-level variables, namely educational attainment and willingness to appro-
priate another individuals’ earned income. Again, this information is relevant for
comparative process tracing.
In addition to the previous example, the study by Jakiela et al. depends on
extrapolating from the experimental sample to the whole of the two age cohorts.
Again, this is less of a question of mechanistic extrapolation than a question of the
choice of experimental design, the use of the experiment, and the implementation
of statistical methods. Extrapolating from the sample to the two age cohorts is
about correctly measuring this change in social preferences. As the discussion in the
previous section shows, it is more related internal validity than correctly inferring
psychological mechanisms of respect for property rights and extrapolating them.
Furthermore, questions of generalizability are partly answered, again, by the choice
of experimental design. The authors conduct a lab-like field experiment because it
means that the participants are drawn from the relevant population, but that the
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experimental procedure can be strictly controlled. Like Finan and Schechter, Jakiela
et al. use the experiments as tools for measuring social preferences. They are not
meant to capture why dictators allocate something to the other player. Neither are
the experiments meant to capture mechanisms responsible for the effect between
academic achievement and social preferences.
Further discussion on using dictator games as measurement tools is provided by
Guala & Mittone (2010). They discuss the instability of results from dictator games,
which arise even when results from games with similar subject pools and countries
with similar social structures are combined. Results from dictator games may not
be robust, which casts doubt on the use of the games as a measure of respect for
property rights (cf. Ibid). (Guala & Mittone, 2010, pp. 578-580). Dictator games
yield volatile results because their design is so simple and abstract that they fail to
elicit a specific norm, and the experimental participants fail to observe any norm
that they should act in accordance with (Guala & Mittone, 2010, p. 581). There
are two reasons why this is not likely a concern for the validity of the outcomes of
the experiments conducted by Jakiela et al. First, the doubts cast on the use of the
dictator game as a tool of research mainly concern dictator games that are meant to
yield evidence that either supports or falsifies standard theory (cf. Guala & Mittone,
2010, p. 581). This is not the point of the experiments that Jakiela et al. conduct.
Second, dictator games may elicit specific norms when their design is altered
(Guala & Mittone, 2010). For example, Cherry et al. (2002) add a “legitimacy
factor” to the dictator’s assets by making the dictator earn the money, instead of
simply getting the money (Guala & Mittone, 2010, p. 597). This gives the partic-
ipants reference to norms that they encounter in situations in real life (Ibid). The
experimental design triggers a “powerful normative mechanism that invites people
to behave in a self-interested manner” (Ibid, 581). This is comparable to the modi-
fications to the dictator game design made by Jakiela et al., where the money to be
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divided is not windfall money, but earned by the player not in the dictator’s role.17
What about extrapolation to new contexts? Extrapolating claims from the
study with comparative process tracing faces similar challenges as extrapolating
claims from the vote-buying study. The randomized field trial and lab-like field
experiment opened the black box of the educational policy, so the population from
which the study sample of girls is drawn could act as one concrete target. Even
then, the question remains: Is the relevant target for generalization here the two
cohorts who participated in the intervention, or some bigger set of the population of
the Busia district? Jakiela et al. note that a parallel randomized experiment in the
Teso district, a neighbor of the Busia district, did not provide conclusive evidence
regarding the success of the GSP scholarship competition. This was partly due to
difficulties in program implementation. (Jakiela et al., 2015, p. 390) In light of the
evidence available, the target population to which experimental inferences from the
study could be generalized is restricted to the Busia district.
No concrete target external Busia is identified, so whether information about
causally relevant similarities or differences between the study system and a target is
available is not self-evident. If the target system where inferences about the effects
of educational attainment are extrapolated to a district in Finland, different back-
ground information about contextual factors is needed than if the target system
is another district in Kenya. Additionally, the available evidence supports many
explanations about mechanisms between academic achievement and social prefer-
ences. It depends on the target whether extrapolating the “wrong” mechanism has
any consequences, like Steel argues that extrapolating the wrong preference rever-
sal mechanism has. Last, in the previous study, the results remain policy-relevant
even though they are not directly transportable to any new circumstance. Overall,
similarly to the study by Jakiela et al, the study illustrates in more detail how extrap-
17The design Jakiela et al. use is innovative, and has not yet replicated well.
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olation is a question of both experimental methodology and epistemic justification.
Understanding both is key in understanding how the problem of extrapolation can
be solved in social science.
4.4 Comparative Process Tracing as Extrapolation in Eco-
nomics
Steel’s example of extrapolating claims about the carcinogenic effects of aflatoxin B1
illustrates how comparative process tracing works as an account of extrapolation in
biology. The examples in this case study have shown that in experimental economics
illustrate the methodological challenges that extrapolation, specifically extrapola-
tion as comparative process tracing, faces in experimental economics. Applying
comparative process tracing to examples of studies interested in social mechanisms
shows that many challenges to extrapolation are about finding the right experimen-
tal methods to suit one’s epistemic goals. Analyzing whether comparative process
tracing can account for extrapolation in economics shows that understanding the
practical challenges to extrapolation that stem from economic methodology can
complement our understanding of the epistemological challenges to extrapolation in
social science, and how they can be overcome.
On an argumentative level, the authors of both studies present their findings
in a way that suggests that their findings are relevant to theoretical and empiri-
cal research in general, rather than just the site-specific experiments conducted in
both studies. “We argue that in rural Paraguay, vote-buying is sustained, in part,
by intrinsic reciprocity [...] our findings provide evidence on the influence that reci-
procity can have in politics”, Finan and Schechter argue (Finan & Schechter, 2012, p.
879). Jakiela et al. write, “We provide evidence that increases in human capital, as
captured in academic achievement tests, alter individual values, generating greater
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respect for earned property rights. This finding demonstrates that formal education
can have cultural impacts...” (Jakiela et al., 2015, p. 404).
In principle, comparative process tracing is a very useful account of extrapo-
lation in social science. It explains when and how information about causal mech-
anisms can be used to aid extrapolation. Social science is often interested in ex-
plaining social phenomena with the mechanisms that produce them, and using that
information to extrapolate findings from one context to another seems ideal. For
example, identifying the social mechanisms operating in a field experiment could
increase knowledge of the invariance of causal effects across contexts and help ex-
trapolation.
A conceptual challenge related to applying comparative process tracing to the
social sciences concerns the definition of “mechanism” employed by Steel. The main
takeaway from the studies is that the social mechanisms identified by both Finan
and Schechter and Jakiela et al. are the relevant causal structure about which more
information could be helpful for extrapolating claims about the observed effects
to new contexts. The nature of social mechanisms might complicate transferring
comparative process tracing to social science like Steel suspects, but an unclear grasp
of the relevant concept of mechanism and consequently, the relevant mechanistic
knowledge, might complicate it as well.
In addition, it is important to note how scientists themselves use the concept
of mechanism. Marchionni (2017) introduces four ways in which the concept of
mechanism is used in economics, originally explicated by Reiss (2013). First, econo-
metricians use the notion of mechanisms to distinguish causality from correlation.
Second, mechanisms are understood as the intervening variables between a cause and
its effect. Third, mechanisms are understood as underlying structures or processes,
for example the market. Fourth, mechanisms are understood as pieces of theory that
explicate, for example, the conditions for some economic phenomena. (Marchionni,
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2017, p. 423; Reiss, 2013, p. 104-105) Marchionni refers to the two latter notions as
mechanisms as underlying structures, and states that they are the ones that come
closest to how mechanisms are commonly understood by mechanistic philosophers
now (Marchionni, 2017, p. 243). Philosophical discussions about causal inference
and extrapolation do not always keep this understanding of mechanisms separate
from the understanding of mechanisms as intervening variables (Ibid).
It is not clear that the concept of mechanism relevant for Steel is similarly
relevant for experimental economists looking into social mechanisms, as it is for
researchers interested in biological mechanisms. For example, in the studies mech-
anisms between reciprocity and vote-buying and educational attainment, academic
achievement and social preferences are treated more like underlying structures than
intervening variables. Reiterating Kuorikoski’s argument about two kinds of mech-
anism concepts, it is not entirely clear that the knowledge about mechanisms that
Steel states is necessary for extrapolation as comparative process tracing actually
matches the mechanistic knowledge that is relevant for social scientists, or possible
for them to gain. Consequently, it is not clear that comparative process tracing can
account for what kind of information about mechanisms is necessary for extrapola-
tion and concluding that a causal stays invariant in new targets.18
From a methodological standpoint, the examples illustrate the practical chal-
lenges stemming from experimental methodology that using comparative process
tracing as extrapolation in experimental economics faces. Even when an experiment
is interested in and able to explain a phenomenon with mechanisms, extrapolat-
ing claims about the mechanisms with comparative process tracing is not entirely
possible. As mentioned, Steel himself suspects that comparative process tracing
18Nicholson (2012) discusses the different notions of mechanism in philosophy of biology. He
discusses the disparities in philosophers’ and biologists’ understanding of mechanisms, and the
implications those disparities have for philosophy of science interested in mechanisms.
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may not work as well in social science as it does biology. The examples in the case
study show that this skepticism is more a byproduct of the way he sets comparative
process tracing up as an account of extrapolation, rather than the reasons Steel
himself suggests. As it stands, comparative process tracing is an epistemologically
comprehensive account of extrapolation, but it does not meet the practical side of
experimental inquiry in economics. Scientific inquiry depends on extrapolation, so
understanding the methodological and practical issues related to it enhances any
theoretical or epistemological account on the topic.
The case study highlights the importance of the target population for mech-
anistic extrapolation. Conclusions about the usefulness of knowing the target are
similar to those made by Reiss (2018). He argues for a pragmatist, contextual episte-
mology of evidential reasoning. Reasoning about causal dependencies within target
systems should “begin with a hypothesis about that system, and ask what types of
evidence we need to establish that hypothesis” (Reiss, 2018). Reiss also points out
the different practical functions experiments may have in scientific inquiry: they
suggest hypotheses, provide direct support for hypotheses and specify existing hy-
potheses (Reiss 2018). Cartwright and Deaton (2018) also voice similar concerns
with regard to randomized controlled trials. They argue that randomized controlled
trials can be used for a variety of purposes, and not all of those purposes include or
require the application of experimental results to new targets (Deaton & Cartwright,
2018, p. 10). Randomized controlled trials, like all experiments, are ways to learn
different kinds of things. They can provide counterexamples to general theoreti-
cal propositions, confirm predictions of theory, or used as evaluation procedures, to
show stakeholders that a project achieved its goals (Ibid, 13). These functions are
exemplified by the examples.
In addition, the case study illustrates that different types of experiments can
be concerned with different types of extrapolation. Khosrowi (2019) distinguishes
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between attributive extrapolation and predictive extrapolation, and argues that the
latter is more prevalent in evidence-based policy. Attributive extrapolation attempts
“attribute an observed effect causally to its suspected causes” (Khosrowi, 2019, p.
50). Predictive extrapolation, which is the kind of extrapolation usually encoun-
tered in evidence-based policy, aims to “predict the future effects of (interventions
on) suspected causes” (Ibid). Put simply, attributive extrapolation is interested in
conclusions about the causes of effects in a particular study setting, and predic-
tive extrapolation aims at reaching predictive inferences about the effects of future
interventions on a different target (Ibid). Predictive extrapolation is utilized in situ-
ations where the intervention of interest (such as an educational reform or a welfare
reform) has not been implemented in the target, or its effects in the target not
observed (Ibid).
Steel’s welfare program example and the studies conducted by Finan and Schechter
and Jakiela et al. illustrate the difference. Steel is not concerned with finding out the
causes behind changes in well-being in a welfare program or welfare reform. Instead,
he is concerned with extrapolating causal claims about the effects of an intervention
to contexts where the intervention has yet to be observed. The extrapolation that
the examples in the case study are concerned with, on the other hand, resembles
attributive extrapolation. Both studies are concerned with studying the causes of
effects in a particular study setting, namely the factors behind vote-buying in ru-
ral Paraguay, and the causes behind changes in academic achievement and social
preferences in Kenya.19
I do not mean to argue that comparative process tracing fails as a mecha-
nistic account of extrapolation, or that extrapolation based on information about
19Khosrowi argues that comparative process tracing does not work very well when predictive
extrapolation is the aim, but because his arguments concern econometrics and evidence-based
policy specifically, I will not discuss them here.
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causal mechanisms is never relevant for economics or for policy; on the contrary.
The case study does not diminish Steel’s arguments regarding the importance and
usefulness of mechanistic extrapolation for social science, but details the specific
challenges mechanistic extrapolation faces where it could be used, namely policy-
relevant studies interested in learning about causal mechanisms. The case studies
show that a solution to “the problem of extrapolation” faces challenges on multiple
levels. There are the general, epistemological puzzles that Steel scrutinizes, the ex-
trapolator’s circle and the problem of heterogeneity. On a related level, there are the
challenges that specific methods such as field experiments, as well as the phenomena
being studied, pose for identifying causation, mechanisms, and relevant background
evidence for extrapolation.
Last, there are the questions related to the practical aims of different studies.
Policy-relevant research are broad, one experiment is just an experiment, and ex-
perimental evidence one type of evidence among many. The case study shows that
inferences about the outcomes of behavioral experiments may not be straightfor-
wardly applicable to policy-making or immediately transportable to new contexts,
but can nonetheless provide insights for policy. Results and inferences from experi-
mental and observational studies can provide testable hypotheses for future studies.
To conclude, comparative process tracing remains a useful epistemological account
of extrapolation, but it needs to be complemented with a specific methodological
account of how to address the kinds of challenges mechanistic extrapolation faces in
practice, and with respect to different goals.
5 Conclusions: Solving Problems of Extrapolation
Extrapolation is a central concern for many different sciences, fields and disciplines.
This thesis has investigated extrapolation in social science. In particular, the focus
75
has been on mechanistic extrapolation and the applicability of comparative process
tracing in economics. The second chapter discussed external validity, a concept
typically used in discussions of extrapolation in economics. It highlighted the differ-
ent ways in which the concept is used in economics, and discussed methodological
analysis by philosophers of economics. The central conclusion was that instead of
understanding external validity as something inherent to causal claims, the concept
should be understood as describing a relationship of generalizability or transporta-
bility between a model system and a specified target system where inferences about
phenomena in the model system could be extrapolated to. When external validity
is understood this way, both concepts of validity are useful in analyzing possible
errors in the experimental process, at least to a certain extent.
The third chapter presented extrapolation as comparative process tracing and
field experiments in economics. The chapter discussed the central concepts in un-
derstanding comparative process tracing and the key characteristics, uses of and
motivations for conducting field experiments. Many argue field experiments to pro-
vide causal claims that extrapolate well. The discussion in experimental economics
and philosophy of economics shows that it is not necessarily so. One solution to
methodological issues of experimentation are lab-like field experiments, which com-
bine elements from laboratory and field experiments. Last, the chapter argued that
while comparative process tracing is in principle a fruitful approach for understand-
ing extrapolation in field experiments, it is also likely to encounter challenges.
The fourth chapter consisted of a case study with two examples of studies that
utilize lab-like field experiments as part of their experimental design. The examples
illustrated that applying comparative process tracing to actual cases of extrapolation
in economics encounters conceptual and methodological challenges. The examples
show that the requirements regarding information about causal structure and back-
ground evidence, so essential for comparative process tracing, may not be possible
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to attain if the relevant concept of mechanism and methodological challenges are not
properly understood. Epistemological puzzles such as the extrapolator’s circle and
the problem of heterogeneity are an intriguing and fruitful starting point for inves-
tigating the knowledge one needs to extrapolate in a warranted way. The examples
show that the epistemic warrant for an extrapolation also requires understanding
the methodological problems of extrapolation.
I suggest that a general, epistemological account of extrapolation across the
sciences is valuable in its own right, whether one is interested in extrapolation with
information about causal mechanisms such as Steel (2008), or frameworks of ana-
logical reasoning, such as Guala (2010) and Steel (2010). However, to understand
extrapolation as an epistemological question and as a part of scientific practice, these
accounts need to be complemented by a more specific methodological account of ex-
trapolation in practice in specific fields of science. Field experiments in economics
can be used for a variety of goals, from accumulating causal knowledge to testing the
effectiveness of a policy. Distinguishing the epistemic and practical, epistemological
and methodological issues of extrapolation relevant for each goal, and tailoring our
account of extrapolation according to those goals, is a fruitful way to build a more
comprehensive understanding of extrapolation in social science in general.
Finally, the examples raise questions that are relevant for future research. Ex-
trapolation is an issue highly relevant for policy, but in the discussions on extrapola-
tion and external validity, there are at least two kinds of claims up for extrapolation:
claims about causal relations, and claims about the effectiveness of policies. Both
examples in the case study provide claims about causal relationships. In contrast,
the claim that the policy intervention was effective regarding academic achievement,
or Steel’s welfare program case, are examples of claims about policy effectiveness.
This distinction between causal claims and policy claims is made by Mireles-
Flores (2016). According to Mireles-Flores, claims about causal efficacy do not
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necessarily correspond to claims about policy effectiveness. Causal relations are
usually studied in isolation, so that the relevant dimensions of producing the causal
effect are kept under control, in order to shield the causal relata from disturbing
factors. The effectiveness of policies, on the other hand, is studied by identifying the
potential disturbing causes with regard to a particular policy effect. Then, a way to
understand the “concurrent interactions of all the relevant causes for the production
of the effect” is established. The evidence that supports a causal generalization is
not necessarily the same as the evidence that supports a policy recommendation
which is chosen according to the policy goal in mind. (Ibid, 25-26) Whether there
are differences in extrapolating causal claims and claims about policy effectivenessn
could be a relevant question when applying comparative process tracing to the social
sciences.
The second question concerns the differences in extrapolation between different
phases of scientific inquiry. Baetu (2015) discusses the difference between mecha-
nistic extrapolation in basic science in medicine and mechanistic extrapolation in
clinical trials. Whereas extrapolation in clinical trials can often rely on mechanistic
evidence because it is available, this is typically not possible in early stages of basic
research, where said mechanisms and mechanistic evidence are only being discovered
and studied. (Baetu 2015, 943-944) In basic science, we may not have mechanistic
information to extrapolate with, so it cannot be used to eliminate sources of error in
extrapolation, as comparative process tracing instructs us to do (Ibid, 954-957). The
issue is relevant to the examples discussed in this chapter, because they too are at the
stage of research where mechanistic evidence to explain a phenomenon is only being
discovered, construed and interpreted. This is similar to what Guala (2010) points
out: Steel argues that uncertainty about causal mechanisms can hinder mechanistic
extrapolation, but this may be more dependent on the stage of research, rather than
the nature of the phenomenon (Guala, 2010, 1079). Whether extrapolation in the
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social sciences faces the issues regarding the availability of mechanistic information
at different stages of research is also a question for future research.20
Throughout this thesis, two lines of thinking have been discussed, side-by-side:
the epistemological questions related to extrapolation, as they are typically discussed
in philosophy of science, and the methodological issues of extrapolation as they are
present in research in economics. Both point to the same conclusion. When one looks
at the extrapolation in the social sciences more closely, the problem of extrapolation
quickly transforms into multiple questions of identifying, clarifying, and controlling
the epistemic risk and possibilities of error in generalizing and transporting claims
from one context to another. Many issues of extrapolation are related to questions
of internal validity. A solution or account that is universally applicable to “the
problem of extrapolation” or “the problem of external validity” is likely to miss out
on some, crucial aspect of extrapolation. Baetu’s arguments about extrapolation as
the taking of an epistemic risk and the implausibility of finding a universal solution
to the problem of extrapolation may well hold in economics.
All in all, comparative process tracing as an account of extrapolation is theoret-
ically comprehensive and fruitful also for the social sciences, to an extent. It shows
when and how mechanistic information can act as evidence for and help guarantee
the success of an extrapolation, and operates with scientific practice in mind. As an
account of extrapolation in economics in practice, it has its limitations. By scruti-
nizing actual cases of extrapolation in experimental economics, this thesis has high-
lighted the benefits of understanding issues of extrapolation related to experimental
methodology. This methodological understanding complements and enhances un-
derstanding of the epistemological analysis of the problem of extrapolation. Overall,
many fruitful avenues of future research remain.
20Favereau (2016) studies the presumed analogy between randomized controlled trials in medical
research and randomized field experiments in development economics more closely.
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